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INTRODUCTION 
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Black wrote that the 
Constitution limits the President’s “functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”1 
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution is the source of the President’s 
recommending function, stating that the President “shall from time to time 
give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend 
to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient . . . .”2 Presidents dating back to George Washington have relied 
on the Recommendations Clause3 as a positive source of authority to make 
legislative recommendations to Congress. In an interesting twist, however, 
recent administrations have also frequently wielded it as a source of negative 
power to escape statutory requirements to provide information to Congress. 
Despite a great deal of scholarship and media commentary on executive 
power and the presidency, the active role of the Recommendations Clause in 
legislative politics as a source of negative presidential power has gone largely 
unexplored. This Comment sheds light on this important intersection of 
constitutional law and interbranch politics. 
A recent example illustrates the significance of the Recommendations 
Clause as a tool of negative executive power. In 2003, Congress passed the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
(Medicare Modernization Act),4 which codified a provision requiring that the 
President recommend responsive legislation to Congress in the event of a 
“medicare funding warning.”5 A Medicare funding warning occurs when the 
 
1 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
3 Some sources use the singular Recommendation Clause, while others use the plural 
Recommendations Clause. For consistency, I exclusively use the latter. 
4 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
5 31 U.S.C. § 1105(h)(1) (2018). 
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portion of Medicare expenditures paid for with general revenues, as opposed 
to dedicated Medicare funding, surpasses forty-five percent two years in a 
row.6 Despite the law’s clear language that “the President shall submit to 
Congress, within the 15-day period beginning on the date of the budget 
submission to Congress . . . proposed legislation to respond to such 
warning,”7 every President since has indicated that they view this requirement 
as optional.8 While President George W. Bush ultimately did submit the 
required proposed legislation to Congress after a Medicare funding warning 
during his tenure, Presidents Obama and Trump did not comply with the 
requirement.9 They both declared in their budgets that they viewed the law 
as merely “advisory” and did not submit responsive legislation within the 
prescribed fifteen-day period.10 The upshot is that Congress passed a law, but 
multiple Presidents unilaterally decided not to comply with the obligation it 
placed on them. Members of Congress and their constituents might 
understandably demand to know: on what authority? 
The answer offered by these presidents is explored in depth in Section 
III.A, but the short version is: the Recommendations Clause. This Comment 
explores the exercise of this type of negative power under the 
Recommendations Clause by recent administrations. It is the first to 
comprehensively address this issue. Just two scholarly articles squarely 
address the Recommendations Clause, but they explore the interaction of the 
positive duty to recommend with laws that frustrate performance of that 
duty—most commonly “muzzling laws” that prohibit the use of funds to study 
a policy area and thereby impede the President from crafting a 
recommendation in that area.11 By contrast, I focus on laws that require the 
 
6 See id. (citing MMA § 801(a)(2), 117 Stat. at 2357). 
7 Id. (emphasis added). 
8 See infra Section III.A. 
9 See infra Section III.A. 
10 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 197 (2009) 
[hereinafter 2010 BUDGET]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 23 
(2019) [hereinafter 2020 BUDGET]. 
11 See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2080, 2101 (1989) 
(defining muzzling laws as “any legislation that impairs the Executive’s ability to deploy resources 
to study or advocate a change in the federal government’s policies on a particular issue” and arguing 
that “the structure of the Constitution does not allow the appropriations power . . . to override the 
President’s constitutional duty to recommend policy measures to Congress”). See generally Vasan 
Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing 
the Constitution’s role for the President in the legislative process). Several other commentators have 
more briefly addressed the Recommendations Clause in the context of broader works. See, e.g., Mark 
R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 
48 ARK. L. REV. 239, 286-92 (1995) (describing attitudes toward the Recommendations Clause 
during the Constitutional Convention, ratification debates, and the First Congress); Harold J. 
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President to make a recommendation on a given policy topic and explore 
whether they infringe on presidential discretion under the Recommendations 
Clause, as recent presidential administrations claim. 
Accordingly, I have three goals in this Comment. In Part I, I seek to build 
on the limited scholarship about the history and purpose of the 
Recommendations Clause and the different ways Presidents and Congress 
have interpreted and applied it. I show that the Framers made it the 
President’s constitutional duty to make legislative recommendations to 
Congress in order to increase information flow from an executive branch, 
with unique access to policy information, to a legislative branch in need of 
that information to effectively discharge its lawmaking function. 
In Part II, I describe the types of arguments administrations make about 
the scope of negative presidential power, incident to the positive duty to 
recommend under the Recommendations Clause, and how those arguments 
are developed in and expressed by the executive branch. Specifically, I 
identify a common presidential practice that has not previously been the 
subject of thorough academic attention: asserting negative power under the 
Recommendations Clause to escape statutory requirements to provide 
legislative recommendations to Congress, like the one in the Medicare 
Modernization Act. I call these statutory requirements “triggering laws.” A 
triggering law is any bill or statute that requires the executive branch to make 
a legislative recommendation to Congress on a particular topic but does not 
dictate the content of that recommendation.12 
My research reveals that, despite the lack of scholarly attention to the 
issue, it has become common practice for presidents to assert negative power 
under the Recommendations Clause to escape triggering laws, both by 
seeking to influence the content of pending legislation containing triggering 
provisions and through signing statements and legal memoranda stating how 
the administration will interpret triggering laws after they are passed. For 
example, going back to Ronald Reagan, presidents have issued ninety-nine 
signing statements expressing objections to triggering laws on 
Recommendations Clause grounds—often expressing multiple objections in 
the same statement.13 President George W. Bush was the most prolific, 
issuing sixty such signing statements. President Trump is on pace to rival that 
 
Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523, 539-46 (2008) (analyzing the 
role of the Recommendations Clause in the George W. Bush Administration’s conception of the 
unitary executive theory); Rajiv Mohan, Chevron and the President’s Role in the Legislative Process, 64 
ADMIN L. REV. 793, 798-801 (2012) (providing a brief history of the Recommendations Clause). 
12 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1105(h)(1) (2018) (requiring the president to submit “proposed 
legislation to respond to” a Medicare funding warning). 
13 See infra subsection II.C.3. 
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number, having already issued sixteen such statements.14 Add to that figure 
other executive communications about legislation still pending in Congress, 
like Department of Justice (DOJ) views letters15 and informal exchanges, and 
the Recommendations Clause comes into focus as an actively used tool of 
negative executive power. 
In Parts III and IV, I argue against using the Recommendations Clause in 
this way. I contend that the scope of presidential discretion under the 
Recommendations Clause is more limited than recent administrations claim 
and that triggering laws like the Medicare Modernization Act generally do 
not infringe on that discretion. I contend that, while administrations have 
rightly objected to muzzling laws as impediments to the President fulfilling 
his or her duty to make recommendations to Congress, triggering laws do not 
frustrate the President’s performance of any constitutionally assigned 
function. I conclude that reading the Recommendations Clause to confer 
exclusive discretion on the President broad enough to preclude enforcement 
of triggering laws subverts its purpose, offends separation of powers 
principles, and risks permitting an administration to bottleneck executive 
branch information important to congressional lawmaking and oversight in 
the office of the President. 
I. THE POSITIVE DUTY TO RECOMMEND 
A. The Recommendations Clause at the Framing 
The Framers considered, and rejected, making it optional for the 
President to recommend legislation to Congress. An early draft of the 
Constitution from the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 
included a Recommendations Clause reading, “He shall, from time to time, 
give information to the Legislature, of the State of the Union: he may 
recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, 
and expedient . . . .”16 According to James Madison’s notes from the 
convention, on August 24, 1787, a motion passed amending the clause to its 
current construction, replacing “may” with “shall,” “in order to make it the 
duty of the President to recommend, & thence prevent umbrage or cavil at 
his doing it.”17 The Framers were apparently concerned that the President 
would refrain from engaging with Congress on important issues out of fear 
 
14 See infra subsection II.C.3. 
15 See infra subsection II.C.2. 
16 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 392 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840) (emphasis added) (recording the final report of the committee 
of detail). 
17 Id. at 526. 
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that Congress would resent the intrusion on its legislative power and exact 
political revenge.18 They changed the language of the clause in order to 
guarantee presidential input on legislation.19 
Another change to the language of the clause lends additional support to 
this reading. A preliminary draft of the Constitution, produced by the 
Convention’s Committee of Detail and found among the papers of one of its 
members, James Wilson, shows that the Recommendations Clause originally 
stated that the President “may recommend Matters” to Congress.20 The 
chairman of the Committee, Edward Rutledge, crossed out “matters” and 
replaced it with “such measures as he shall judge nesy. & expedt.”21 The change 
suggests a preference for more in-depth presidential involvement in 
lawmaking, inasmuch as “measures” implies that recommendations should be 
formed means to identified ends, in contrast to the spare referrals or general 
observations that might qualify as recommended “matters.”22 
Taken together, the changes to the draft text demonstrate the Framers’ 
intent to guarantee that the President would play a substantive role in 
congressional lawmaking.23 Early scholars agreed that this desire for 
collaboration was based on the unique institutional competency of the 
executive. In his appendix to Blackstone’s Commentaries, St. George Tucker 
noted that “[a]s from the nature of the executive officer it possesses more 
 
18 See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2082 (explaining that making it a duty to recommend legislation 
to Congress made it so “partisans of congressional power could not argue that the President’s 
participation in lawmaking was part of a scheme to usurp Congress’[s] legislative power”). 
19 The Recommendations Clause was understood at the time as creating a duty on the 
President. In his first inaugural address, George Washington stated, “[b]y the article establishing 
the executive department it is made the duty of the President ‘to recommend to your consideration 
such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.’” George Washington, First Inaugural 
Address (Apr. 30, 1789), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, S. DOC. 101-10, at 3 (1989) [hereinafter INAUGURAL ADDRESSES] (emphasis added). 
20 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 171 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 
[hereinafter 2 CONVENTION RECORDS] (emphasis added). The Convention’s deliberations began 
in earnest on May 29, 1787, with Edmund Randolph’s presentation on behalf of the Virginia 
delegation of a set of resolutions to “correct[] & enlarge[]” the Articles of Confederation, referred 
to as the Virginia Plan. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter 1 CONVENTION RECORDS]. After several weeks spent discussing 
and amending the resolutions, the Convention referred a draft to the Committee of Detail to use in 
creating an initial draft Constitution. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra, at 128. 
21 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 20, at 171 (emphasis added). 
22 See Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 48-49 (“One well-accepted meaning of the word 
‘measure’ at the Founding, and one largely overlooked today, is a ‘legislative bill or enactment.’ The 
Recommendation Clause thus makes clear that the President shall recommend legislation and not 
merely put forth indefinite ideas.”); Sidak, supra note 11, at 2084 (“To the extent that a ‘measure’ 
connotes the formulation of a proposed solution to an identified condition, the submission of 
‘measures’ implies greater presidential participation in the lawmaking process than would the mere 
submission of ‘matters’ to Congress for its rumination.”). 
23 See Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 64 (“Far from making the President a cipher in the 
legislative process, the Constitution created the Legislator-in-Chief.”). 
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immediately the sources, and means of information than the other 
departments of government,” and therefore “the constitution has made it the 
duty of the supreme executive functionary, to lay before the federal 
legislature, a state of such facts as may be necessary to assist their 
deliberations on the several subjects confided to them by the constitution.”24 
Justice Story agreed that, due to the “nature and duties of the executive 
department, [the President] must possess more extensive sources of 
information . . . than can belong to congress.”25 He argued that the 
Recommendations Clause recognized the President’s unique visibility into 
“the defects in the nature or arrangements” of different policy areas and made 
him “responsible, not merely for a due administration of the existing systems, 
but for due diligence and examination into the means of improving them.”26 
The fact that the Constitution calls for the President to provide information 
on the state of the union to Congress further shows that the Framers believed 
the President had unique access to information relevant to congressional 
lawmaking.27 
To be sure, the exclusivity of the President’s access to policy information 
has diminished as Congress has developed far greater factfinding capacity.28 
Congress’s enhanced ability to inform itself has been offset, however, by 
significant growth in the scope of executive power, and thereby in the scope 
of policy information available to the President.29 Thus the executive branch 
continues to be “the repository of the country’s most important information 
for public policy formulation.”30 Whether or not the President retains special 
access to information, the early agreement that he did—agreement that 
included influential lawmakers31—strongly supports reading the 
 
24 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app., at 344 (Phila., Birch & 
Small 1803). 
25 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1555, at 412-13 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
26 Id. at 413. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
28 See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2087 (“In addition to its power to conduct hearings, the current 
Congress has information-gathering arms . . . . [During] Jefferson’s Administration, Congress had 
to rely extensively on the information and recommendations of the President and his department 
heads, for Congress had no staff and its members did not even have offices.”). 
29 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727-28 (1996) 
(explaining that, through the president’s power as both commander in chief of the armed forces—
with massive clandestine and destructive faculties—and as head of a vast administrative state capable 
of influencing most areas of social and economic life, “[n]ever has the executive branch been more 
powerful, nor more dominant over its two counterparts”). 
30 Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of 
Presidential Information, 90 GEO L.J. 737, 739 (2002). 
31 See, e.g., Killenbeck, supra note 11, at 286-92 (noting that, while some worried about undue 
influence of the president over Congress, then-Congressman James Madison argued that the 
alternative of an aloof president would be worse because the “[i]nconsistent, unproductive, and 
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Recommendations Clause as reflecting an intention to increase information 
flow from executive to legislature by making it the duty of the President to 
recommend measures to Congress.32 
B. Defining the Scope of the Duty to Recommend 
Today, it is so common for the President to be deeply involved in 
congressional lawmaking that the Framers’ concerns about a reclusive 
executive seem anachronistic. But it was not always so. The 
Recommendations Clause gives the President the discretion to “judge” what 
measures are necessary and expedient for purposes of making affirmative 
recommendations, and thereby define for himself the scope of his duty. 
Different presidents have defined that scope differently. 
In his first inaugural address to Congress, George Washington stated his 
understanding that Article II made it his duty to provide recommendations, 
but he found it more expedient to flatter the nation’s first Congress, which 
had convened just weeks before, than to make specific policy 
recommendations.33 He thought it “more consistent with th[e] circumstances, 
and far more congenial with the feelings which actuate [him], to substitute, 
in place of a recommendation of particular measures, the tribute that is due 
to the talents, the rectitude, and the patriotism which adorn the characters 
selected to devise and adopt them.”34 He elaborated that he lacked the 
experience in office required to judge measures for recommendation: “Instead 
of undertaking particular recommendations on this subject, in which I could 
be guided by no lights derived from official opportunities, I shall again give 
 
expensive schemes” of a Congress operating without the benefit of executive input “will be more 
injurious to our constituents than the undue influence which the well-digested plans of a well-
informed officer can have”). 
32 See id. at 306 (“[The Recommendations Clause] is more than a simple attempt to defuse 
controversy if and when the President actually speaks. It reflects . . . that the executive is in a 
superior . . . position to convey the [electorate’s] views . . . to [Congress].”). But see Ass’n of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 908 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining that “the 
Recommendation Clause is less an obligation than a right,” and that the Framers’ use of the word 
“shall” was simply “intended to squelch any congressional objections to the President’s right to 
recommend legislation”). However, the D.C. Circuit seems to have made this observation to 
distinguish the broad discretion granted to the President to decide the scope of his duty under the 
Recommendations Clause, as explained in Section I.B., from the “greater . . . importance” of his 
“affirmative duty” under the Take Care Clause. Id. at 908. This is all the more likely because the 
authority cited by the D.C. Circuit for this proposition actually argues that “[t]he recommendation 
of measures is a duty imposed on the President, for the clause states that ‘he shall recommend.’” 
Sidak, supra note 11, at 2081 (first emphasis added). 
33 See Washington, supra note 19, at 3-4. 
34 Id. 
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way to my entire confidence in your discernment and pursuit of the public 
good . . . .”35 
Other presidents judged it much more to be necessary and expedient to 
provide recommendations to Congress. Millard Fillmore offered 
recommendations to Congress on “the leading subjects of legislation” in his 
first annual message to Congress.36 Ulysses S. Grant went further in his first 
inaugural address, avowing that “[o]n all leading questions agitating the 
public mind” he would “always express [his] views to Congress and urge them 
according to [his] judgment . . . .”37 Franklin Delano Roosevelt tailored his 
recommendations to policies addressing the Great Depression, stating that 
he was “prepared under [his] constitutional duty to recommend the measures 
that a stricken nation in the midst of a stricken world may require.”38 But he 
emphasized just how necessary and expedient he felt his recommendations 
were: should Congress fail to act on his recommendations, he warned, “it may 
be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for 
temporary departure from that normal balance” of executive and legislative 
power and process.39 Even the taciturn Calvin Coolidge40 took the 
opportunity in his first inaugural address to recommend tax reform.41 
Today, we seem to have reached stasis: presidents outline a detailed list 
of legislative recommendations during the state of the union address, in 
other less formal communications on an almost daily basis, and in their active 
role in all stages of the drafting and passing of legislation.42 Modern 
 
35 Id. at 4. 
36 Millard Fillmore, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1850), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2615 (New York, Bureau of National Literature, 
1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES & PAPERS]. Recommendations on these “leading subjects” included 
everything from changes in trade policy, to establishing an “agricultural bureau,” to raising “one or 
more regiments of mounted men” for “protection” against Native American tribes, and more. Id. at 
2616-30. 
37 Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1869), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra 
note 19, at 146 (emphasis added). 
38 Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, 
supra note 19, at 273. 
39 Id. (emphasis added). 
40 On learning that President Coolidge had passed away, the writer Dorothy Parker reportedly 
asked, “How can they tell?” MAX EASTMAN, ENJOYMENT OF LAUGHTER 155 (1936). 
41 Calvin Coolidge, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1925), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra 
note 19, at 253-54. 
42 Some argue that the White House drafts more legislation than Congress now. See, e.g., 
Kathryn Marie Dessayer, Note, The First Word: The President’s Place in “Legislative History,” 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 399, 407 (1990) (“Waiting for the President to propose legislation has become so common 
in modern times that members of Congress have actually begun to expect the administration to 
present a bill as a starting point for consideration of new policies and governmental actions.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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presidents thus appear to have adopted a broad definition of what is 
“necessary and expedient.” 
II. NEGATIVE POWER UNDER THE RECOMMENDATIONS CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that Congress may not “prevent[] 
the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions,”43 although not without controversy.44 Since the 1920s, presidents 
have declared that certain legislative provisions do prevent the executive from 
accomplishing its functions under the Recommendations clause.45 These 
Presidents have made Recommendations Clause objections both to seek 
changes to pending legislation and to state their administration’s plan to 
execute laws already passed according to its own interpretation. Presidents 
exercise this negative power—that is, power to negate or change Congress’s 
exercise of the legislative power—in response to two main types of 
legislation: (1) muzzling laws that forbid the President from using funds to 
explore a specified policy area and (2) triggering laws that require the 
President’s input on a certain policy topic. 
Muzzling laws have been the subject of thorough analysis in just two 
scholarly articles, both of which argue that they violate the Recommendations 
Clause by impeding the President’s ability to craft recommendations.46 But 
 
43 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
44 See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and 
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2120 (2019) for a forceful argument that “history supports readings 
of Article II of the Constitution that limit Presidents to exercise their power when it is motivated 
in the public interest” and that “tend to subordinate presidential power to congressional direction, 
requiring the President to follow the laws, instructions, and authorizations set in motion by the 
legislature.” The authors’ findings “tend to undermine imperial and prerogative claims for the 
presidency. . . .” Id. It is enough for purposes of this Comment to point out descriptively that the 
executive branch does advance its own constitutional interpretation, even as there is active debate 
as to whether it should. Compare Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: 
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 868 (1994) (“[T]he Framers did not 
envision that Presidents would possess the power to suspend laws, even where a President thought 
that the law was unconstitutional.”), with Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221-22 (1994) (arguing that “the President 
possesses the power of full ‘legal review’ of the actions of the other branches—the full power to 
review the lawfulness or correctness of their legal interpretations of the Constitution,” and that “[h]e 
may decline to execute acts of Congress on constitutional grounds . . . . In executing a statute he 
determines is constitutionally valid, he may use his own interpretation of the statute . . . .”). 
45 The earliest objections, however, focused on muzzling laws, not triggering laws. See Sidak, 
supra note 11, at 2097 (identifying a “precursor” to the muzzling laws of the 1980s as early as 1921). 
See infra Section III.C. for a discussion about how the executive branch accepted triggering laws as 
consistent with the Recommendations Clause until the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) first 
articulated an objection in 1981. 
46 See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2118-28; Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 58-59. 
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triggering laws have been almost completely ignored,47 even though they 
represent the real battleground over the scope of negative executive power 
under the Recommendations Clause today.48 
In this Section, I describe how Recommendations Clause objections are 
developed and expressed by the executive branch and show that recent 
administrations express these objections primarily in response to triggering 
laws. I first explain the role of the OLC in developing the legal argument that 
certain laws violate the Recommendations Clause and describe the two 
primary vehicles administrations use to make these arguments: DOJ views 
letters and signing statements. I show that modern administrations are active 
in using both of these tools to state Recommendations Clause objections. I 
then briefly describe the differences between muzzling laws and triggering 
laws and explain the substance of Recommendations Clause objections to 
each. I show that, despite the lack of scholarly attention to the practice, the 
overwhelming majority of the Recommendations Clause objections lodged 
by modern administrations respond to triggering laws. 
A. Recommendations Clause Objections: Form and Frequency 
1. OLC Opinions 
Executive branch legal arguments about the constitutionality of 
legislation are often born in the OLC.49 The OLC was officially established 
in 1950,50 but before that its functions were performed by a specialized 
assistant solicitor general.51 Today, the OLC is led by a Senate-confirmed 
 
47 The only article that appears to address triggering laws does so indirectly in service of a 
broader exploration of unitary executive theory. See Krent, supra note 11, at 541-42 (conceding that 
the view that “Congress cannot compel the President to recommend measures may rest on firm 
ground,” but focusing instead on “whether Congress can mandate recommendations by subordinate 
executive branch officials”). 
48 See infra Section II.B. for evidence that the vast majority of signing statements expressing 
Recommendations Clause objections respond to triggering laws. 
49 The OLC and the DOJ Office of the Solicitor General (SG) are the two principal sources 
of constitutional interpretation in the executive branch. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682 (2005). Justiciability rules 
often keep separation of powers disputes out of the courtroom, and therefore out of the reach of the 
SG in its role as the administration’s chief litigator, while the OLC’s Bill Comment Practice and its 
general presidential advisory role put it in a position to routinely and directly make 
Recommendations Clause arguments. Cf. Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 649-50 (D.C. Cir.), aff ’d sub 
nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) (holding non-justiciable a senatorial candidate’s 
separation of powers challenge to a provision of the Federal Election Commission Act providing for 
legislative review of the Commission’s rules and opinions by only the House of Representatives). 
Accordingly this Comment focuses on the OLC. 
50 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1950, § 4, 15 Fed. Reg. 3173-74, reprinted in 64 Stat. 1261 (1950). 
51 Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-78, § 16, 48 Stat. 283, 
307-08 (1933). 
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Assistant Attorney General with a staff of four deputies and around twenty 
career attorney advisors.52 The OLC’s authority arises out of the Attorney 
General’s duty to give “advice and opinion on questions of law when required 
by the President” and respond to requests regarding “questions of law arising 
in the administration of [a] department.”53 
Thus, the “core work” of the OLC consists of “provid[ing] written and 
oral legal opinions” in response to requests from executive branch department 
heads.54 Through these OLC opinions, administrations state legal conclusions 
about the scope of the Recommendations Clause and disseminate them 
throughout the DOJ and to the White House. For example, a 2016 OLC 
opinion addressed to the General Counsel of the Office of Management and 
Budget comprehensively lays out the administration’s argument that neither 
muzzling nor triggering laws are permissible under the Recommendations 
Clause.55 These legal arguments are often first developed by the OLC in 
DOJ views letters and presidential signing statements.56 For example, that 
2016 OLC opinion’s Recommendations Clause analysis relied in part on 
arguments expressed in a signing statement issued in 2003.57 OLC opinions 
also serve as authority for objections stated in future DOJ views letters and 
signing statements. For example, a 2018 DOJ views letter expressing 
 
52 See Pillard, supra note 49, at 713. 
53 28 U.S.C. §§ 511, 512 (2018). The Attorney General formally delegated that responsibility to 
the OLC. 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(b) (2019). 
54 Pillard, supra note 49, at 710. The President and Attorney General are the most common 
requesters. Id. at 711. 
55 See Application of the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C., 2016 WL 10590110, at *3 (Aug. 
25, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 OLC Opinion]; see also Common Legislative Encroachments on Exec. 
Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 248, 256 (1989) (“Despite this Clause, Congress frequently attempts 
by statute to control the executive’s legislative priorities by requiring that the President or his 
subordinates recommend legislative measures on certain subjects.”); Constitutionality of Statute 
Requiring Exec. Agency to Report Directly to Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 632, 640 (1982) (“[A]lthough 
the Constitution gives to the President the right to present legislative recommendations on behalf 
of the Executive Branch, Congress . . . purports to require a subordinate executive official to present 
legislative recommendations of his own. Such a provision clearly transgresses upon the President’s 
constitutionally designated role.”). 
56 See infra subsections II.A.2 and II.A.3 for in-depth discussion of presidential signing 
statements and DOJ views letters. I await reply to a FOIA request for additional OLC documents 
relating to the Recommendations Clause. 
57 See 2016 OLC Opinion , supra note 55, at *2 (quoting Presidential Statement on Signing the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 2003, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 1698 
(Dec. 8, 2003), as declaring that the administration would treat the triggering law in question 
“consistent with the President’s constitutional authority” under the Recommendations Clause). 
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concerns about pending legislation on Recommendations Clause grounds 
cited the 2016 OLC opinion.58 
2. DOJ Views Letters 
The OLC also runs a Bill Comments Practice59 through which it reviews 
all bills introduced in Congress that the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs 
identifies as having a realistic chance at passage to identify any constitutional 
concerns.60 When an attorney advisor identifies a constitutional concern, she 
writes a bill comment about it. After review and approval by an OLC deputy, 
the bill comment is then sent to the Office of Management and Budget for 
approval and addition of any policy commentary.61 It is then sent to 
Congress—usually to the chairs of the committee of jurisdiction, but also to 
bill sponsors or leadership—in a letter, usually over the signature of the 
Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs.62 
Letters from the Obama and Trump Administrations show how 
administrations use this tool to express Recommendations Clause objections 
to Congress about pending legislation.63 They also show that the Trump 
Administration uses DOJ views letters for this purpose more than the Obama 
Administration did. Of the views letters available on the DOJ website, the 
 
58 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter on S. 1591, the Otto 
Warmbier Banking Restrictions Involving North Korea Act of 2017 (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/page/file/1026246/download [https://perma.cc/XHY7-XYGX]. 
59 Less relevant for purposes of this Comment, the OLC also maintains an Orders Practice to 
review executive orders and proclamations, as well as orders and regulations to be issued by the 
Attorney General. See Pillard, supra note 49, at 712. 
60 See Id. at 711-12, 712 n.110. While this formalized process of scrutinizing legislation for 
constitutional issues only took shape more recently, the practice itself dates back to George 
Washington, who requested of his department heads “opinions on the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress.” STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 41 
(2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 32-33, 106-07 (1948)). 
61 See Pillard, supra note 49, at 711-12. 
62 See id. at 712; see also, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter 
on S. 1631, the Department of State Authorities Act of 2018 (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1035286/download [https://perma.cc/R8Q2-3Z8V] (opining 
that two sections of a proposed bill would violate the Recommendations Clause). 
63 For a digital collection of these letters, see Views Letters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/views-letters [https://perma.cc/J4A2-9ATQ] (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) 
[hereinafter DOJ Views Letters]. DOJ views letters gathered from other sources show that views 
letters have been in use since at least as early as 1977. Professor Jean Galbraith and I recently wrote 
a short piece about DOJ views letters. Jean Galbraith & Benjamin Schwartz, The Trump 
Administration and Executive Power: Evidence from Justice Department Views Letters, LAWFARE (Feb. 
5, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-and-executive-power-
evidence-justice-department-views-letters [https://perma.cc/DPR4-9RFG]. The data referenced in 
this section was gathered in connection with that project. We await reply to a FOIA request for 
additional DOJ views letters. 
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Obama Administration sent three stating a Recommendations Clause 
objection through its two terms, while the Trump Administration had already 
sent ten as of August 2019.64 Further, objections stated in DOJ views letters 
often apply to multiple provisions. For example, a recent DOJ views letter 
responding to legislation assigning duties and powers to the Department of 
State objected to two separate provisions on Recommendations Clause 
grounds.65 That letter also illustrates a distinctive feature of DOJ views letters 
in general: they comment on bills that have yet to become law.66 DOJ views 
letters are not reactions to bills passed by Congress; rather, they are intended 
to influence the content of legislation as it winds its way through Congress. 
There is some evidence that DOJ views letters have been successful in 
this effort in certain cases. For example, a version of the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 was reported out of the House 
Intelligence Committee on June 26, 2009 with a provision under the section 
“Protection of Certain National Security Information” requiring the 
President to submit an “assessment of the need for any modification of this 
title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents.”67 That 
version passed the House and was pending in the Senate when a DOJ views 
letter, sent to the chair and vice-chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee 
on March 15, 2010, expressed concern that the language could be “construed 
to require the President to submit legislative recommendations for 
congressional action even where he did not think any legislation is 
advisable . . . .”68 Because that would “violate the Recommendations Clause,” 
the letter advocated a change in the language to only “require 
recommendations of statutory measures deemed appropriate, if any.”69 The 
Senate amended the language, and the version eventually signed by the 
President on October 7, 2010 only required an “assessment of the need, if any, 
for modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal protections 
for covert agents.”70 Using a DOJ views letter, the executive branch 
 
64 DOJ Views Letters, supra note 63; Galbraith & Schwartz, supra note 63. The blog post only 
discusses data from President Obama’s first two years in office, but I used the DOJ website to collect 
data on DOJ views letters sent during the entirety of his two terms for that project. 
65 See Views Letter on S. 1631, supra note 62 (“Sections 102(b)(4) and 103(b)(10) of the bill 
would violate the Recommendations Clause by requiring the Secretary to submit legislative 
recommendations to the Congress.”). 
66 Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018, S. 1631, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(unenacted). 
67 H.R. 2701, 111th Cong. § 362(b) (as passed by House, Feb. 26, 2010). 
68 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter on H.R. 2701 and S. 1491, 
the Intelligence Authorization Bills for Fiscal Year 2010 (Mar. 15, 2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ola/legacy/2010/04/05/031510-ltr-reyes%20re-hr2701-
s1494-intel-auth-bills.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L5B-72TZ]. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 363(b), 124 Stat. 2655, 2702 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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successfully asserted negative power under the Recommendations Clause to 
change legislation pending in Congress. 
Even where a DOJ views letter does not cause a change in legislative 
language, it can foreshadow, often in substantial detail, objections later stated 
in signing statements. For example, the Trump Administration sent a DOJ 
views letter on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 
expressing, among other things, objections to four provisions that “would 
require the Secretary of Defense to recommend legislative measures, in 
contravention of the President’s constitutional authority” under the 
Recommendations Clause.71 President Trump’s signing statement on that bill 
echoed those objections and stated that his “Administration will treat those 
provisions consistent with” the Recommendations Clause.72 This suggests a 
connection between the arguments of the OLC and the positions of the 
President. The fact that the OLC is more or less active in asserting 
Recommendations Clause objections to legislation depending on who the 
President is raises the possibility that OLC legal arguments about the 
Recommendations Clause do not simply reflect neutral opinions about the 
law, but also, or perhaps instead, the constitutional interpretation and 
institutional interests of the President.73 It shows that the President will 
follow through in his execution of the law on Recommendations Clause 
objections first identified in DOJ views letters. 
3. Signing Statements 
Signing statements are “short documents that presidents often issue when 
they sign a bill.”74 They do not, however, have intrinsic legal force; they have 
no formal definition.75 Still, these short documents can have important 
implications. In 1899, the Supreme Court recognized signing statements as a 
 
71 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter on H.R. 2810, the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Nov. 8, 2017). 
72 Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2018, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 906 (Dec. 12, 2017). 
73 There is active debate about whether the OLC operates, or should operate, based on a client 
model whereby it explicitly serves the legal needs of the President, or as a detached “proponent[] of 
the best view of the law.” Pillard, supra note 49, at 685. This Comment does not weigh in on that 
debate beyond observing that the rate at which administrations express Recommendations Clause 
objections to legislation varies from President to President. 
74 Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 
CONST. COMMENT. 307, 308 (2006). 
75 See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33667, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 1 (2012) (“There is no 
explicit constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of presidential signing statements.”); TASK 
FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT 7 (2006) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (“The Constitution 
says nothing about the President issuing any statement when he signs a bill presented to him.”). 
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proper means for the President “to inform Congress by message of his 
approval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded.”76 But most scholars trace 
the origins of the presidential signing statement either to 1822, when James 
Monroe responded to congressional criticism that he was not following a 
recent law with a letter explaining his interpretation,77 or 1830, when Andrew 
Jackson issued a statement declaring that a road Congress meant to run from 
Detroit to Chicago would not extend past the Michigan Territory.78 As these 
early examples suggest, a primary function of signing statements, and the one 
relevant for purposes of this Comment,79 is to advance the President’s 
interpretation of a bill passed by Congress.80 
The OLC elaborated on this function in a 1993 memorandum, asserting 
that on “appropriate occasions” signing statements can perform the “useful 
and legally significant” function of 
informing Congress and the public that the Executive believes that a 
particular provision would be unconstitutional in certain of its applications, 
or that it is unconstitutional on its face, and that the provision will not be 
given effect by the executive branch to the extent that such enforcement 
would create an unconstitutional condition.81 
Through this function, signing statements are another tool the executive 
branch uses to express Recommendations Clause objections to legislation.82 
 
76 La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899). Later decisions 
“accorded signing statements some degree of interpretive weight.” Christopher S. Yoo, Presidential 
Signing Statements: A New Perspective, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1808 (2016); see id. at 1808 n.35 
(providing case law precedent in support of Yoo’s above statement). 
77 James Monroe, Special Message to the Senate (Jan. 17, 1822), in 2 MESSAGES & PAPERS, 
supra note 36, at 680-82; accord CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 60, at 86. 
78 Andrew Jackson, Special Message to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States (May 30, 1830), in 3 MESSAGES & PAPERS, supra note 36, at 1046; accord CALABRESI & YOO, 
supra note 60, at 104. 
79 The OLC defined two other legally important functions of signing statements: “(1) 
explaining to the public, and particularly to constituencies interested in the bill, what the President 
believes to be the likely effects of its adoption; (2) directing subordinate officers within the executive 
branch how to interpret or administer the enactment . . . .” The Legal Significance of Presidential 
Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131, 131 (1993). It also identified and discussed the merits of a 
fourth, “much more controversial” use of signing statements: “to create legislative history to which 
the courts are expected to give some weight when construing the enactment.” Id. 
80 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 74, at 308 (listing one function of signing statements as 
“advanc[ing] particular interpretations of specific provisions of [a] bill”). 
81 Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. at 131. 
82 There is active debate about the constitutionality of signing statements of this type, and 
whether they in effect function as an unconstitutional line-item veto. See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 75, at 5 (opposing the use of this type of signing statement as an unconstitutional 
violation of separation of powers); Bradley & Posner, supra note 74, at 308-10 (arguing that such 
signing statements are constitutional); Yoo, supra note 76, at 1808 (arguing that criticism of 
presidential signing statements as unconstitutional advancements of “their own constructions of the 
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They are also a commonly used tool. Jimmy Carter was the first President 
to make significant use of constitutional signing statements. With twenty-
four in his single term, Carter made more than twice as many such statements 
as any President before him.83 Since Carter, the number of signing statements 
expressing constitutional objections to legislation has exploded.84 President 
Ronald Reagan sent 71 signing statements expressing constitutional 
objections;85 President George H. W. Bush sent 146;86 President Bill Clinton 
sent 105;87 and President George W. Bush sent 127.88 President Obama 
substantially reined in the use of signing statements to make constitutional 
objections, issuing only twenty-three such statements,89 but President Trump 
appears to be re-expanding the practice, having already issued forty-two such 
statements as of August 2019.90 
Many of these constitutional objections were Recommendations Clause 
objections.91 I searched the document archive of University of California 
Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project for written signing statements 
by all presidents since Jimmy Carter using search terms “recommend” and 
“expedient”—two terms that seem to appear in every signing statement 
 
Constitution appear to be overstated”). Without arguing the merits, I presume for purposes of this 
Comment that Presidents will continue to use signing statements in this way. 
83 Christopher S. Kelley, The Unitary Executive and the Presidential Signing Statement 192 





87 Id. Note, however, that a different analysis came up with different numbers: 16 constitutional 
signing statements for Carter, 61 for Reagan, 98 for George H. W. Bush, 65 for Clinton, and 104 for 
George W. Bush. Bradley & Posner, supra note 74, at 323. 
88 GARVEY, supra note 75, at 7. 
89 Provisions of Law Named in Barack Obama’s Signing Statements, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS, http://www.coherentbabble.com/BHOCounts.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ4T-W3CE] 
(last visited March 4, 2019). 
90 Provisions of Law Named in Donald Trump’s Signing Statements, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING 
STATEMENTS, http://www.coherentbabble.com/DJTCounts.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU2K-U8R9] 
(last visited August 29, 2019). However, fluctuations across administrations in the quantity of 
signing statements issued stating constitutional objections do not necessarily indicate differences in 
their substantive positions about proper constitutional interpretation. See Presidential Signing 
Statements, 31 Op. O.L.C. 23, 23 (2007) (arguing that “President Bush’s signing statements are 
indistinguishable from those issued by past Presidents” because his concerns about “infringe[ment 
of] explicit constitutional provisions (such as the Recommendations Clause . . .)” appear in signing 
statements dating back to James Monroe); GARVEY, supra note 75, at 8 (“While the number of 
provisions challenged or objected to by President [George W.] Bush gave rise to controversy, it is 
important to note that the substance of his signing statements did not appear to differ substantively 
from those issued by either Presidents Reagan or Clinton.”). 
91 Other objections included perceived encroachments on the President’s power under the 
Appointments Clause, power to conduct diplomacy, power as Commander-in-Chief, and other 
presidential powers and privileges. 
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containing a Recommendations Clause objection.92 My results show that 
every President since Reagan has used signing statements to make 
Recommendations Clause objections. President Regan issued six; President 
George H. W. Bush issued thirteen; President Clinton issued four; President 
George W. Bush issued sixty-one; President Obama issued three; and 
President Trump has issued seventeen.93 Many of these signing statements 
contained Recommendations Clause objections to multiple provisions of the 
law at issue. President George W. Bush, for example, stated 219 unique 
Recommendations Clause objections across all of his signing statements.94 
 
Figure 1: Signing Statements Expressing Recommendations Clause 





92 Document Archive,  AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/advanced-
search [https://perma.cc/JF7W-KDMS] (last visited Dec. 22, 2019) (enter “expedient” in the box 
labeled “All of these Terms” and enter “recommend* Recommend*” in the box labeled “Any of these 
Terms”; select “Signing Statements” from the “Document Category” box; select the desired president 
from the “Presidents” box). All results were confirmed as Recommendations Clause objections. 
93 See id. 
94 Neil Kinkopf & Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of Presidential Signing 
Statements, 2001–2009 , at 185 (Ohio St. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
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B. Recommendations Clause Objections: Substance 
To different extents, it has become common presidential practice to use 
both DOJ views letters and signing statements to lodge objections to 
legislation under the Recommendations Clause. However, objections to 
muzzling laws and objections to triggering laws differ in important ways that 
can bear on whether they are properly made. 
1. Muzzling Laws 
A muzzling law is “any legislation that impairs the Executive’s ability to 
deploy resources to study or advocate a change in the federal government’s 
policies on a particular issue.”95 Presidents have objected to these laws since 
at least 1912, when President Taft declared of a provision in an appropriations 
bill dictating the form and timing of this budget proposal: 
To give [the provision] the effect of forbidding the President . . . to 
communicate to Congress recommendations as to expenditures and revenue, 
to acquire information from his subordinates needed to illustrate the utility 
of his recommendations, and to emphasize and point out the application of 
proposed reforms to existing conditions, would be to permit the legislative 
branch of the Government to usurp the functions of the Executive and to 
abridge the executive power in a manner forbidden by the Constitution.96 
The OLC has objected to muzzling laws since at least 1955, when it 
detailed Recommendations Clause objections to legislation that would 
require that the President’s budget submission to Congress contain estimated 
expenditures not exceeding estimated receipts: 
First, in order to fulfill his obligation to transmit information to the 
Congress, together with such measures “as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient,” the President is given absolute discretion as to the character of 
information and recommendations he may choose to transmit. The proposed 
resolution plainly would frustrate the President’s responsibility of advising 
the Congress of the needs of the nation, the measures for fulfilling those 
needs, as his judgment dictates, and the required appropriations therefor. It 
appears too clear for serious question that a legislative fiat which seeks to 
 
95 Sidak, supra note 11, at 2080. 
96 Letter from William Howard Taft, President of the United States to Franklin MacVeagh, 
Secretary of the Treasury (Sept. 19, 1912), in COPY OF LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY RELATIVE TO THE SUBMISSION OF A BUDGET TO CONGRESS 1, 
5 (1912). 
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remove the President’s unlimited judgment in communicating with the 
Congress is in violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution.97 
The Reagan Administration appears to have adapted these arguments to 
the more straightforward type of muzzling law that proliferated during the 
1980s: appropriations riders prohibiting the executive branch from using 
funds to study or advocate a particular policy change.98 President George H. 
W. Bush’s Administration echoed these arguments,99 as have all 
administrations since.100 The thrust of these objections is that prohibiting the 
 
97 Constitutionality of a Joint Resolution Requiring the President to Propose a Balanced 
Budget Every Year, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 161, 161 (1955). 
98 See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2079-80, 2135 (listing several such muzzling laws and noting 
“President Reagan’s acquiescence to muzzling laws”). President Reagan did, however, make 
objections to muzzling laws that at least gestured toward the Recommendations Clause. For 
example, in response to a 1986 appropriations rider prohibiting the administration from studying 
the sale of government energy facilities without congressional authorization, President Reagan 
issued a signing statement, saying, “[t]his ban on studying a valid proposal is an unreasonable 
restriction on the executive branch . . . . I continue to believe that the proposal . . . should be 
pursued.” Presidential Statement on Signing the Urgent Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1986, 
1986 PUB. PAPERS 906, 907 (July 2, 1986). He used slightly stronger language in response to a 1984 
law prohibiting the use of funds for enforcement of certain areas of antitrust law, albeit language 
not directly referencing the Recommendations Clause: “[T]his provision raises questions pertaining 
to the separation of powers among the branches of government, because it seeks to permit 
unwarranted intrusion by Congress into pending law enforcement proceedings brought by an 
administrative agency.” Presidential Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1985, 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1210, 
1210 (Aug. 30, 1984). 
99 President George H. W. Bush objected to a provision purporting to prohibit the use of 
funds to study energy prices on grounds that it “infringe[d] on the Executive’s authority to conduct 
studies that might assist in the evaluation and preparation of such measures” as he deemed necessary 
and expedient under the Recommendations Clause. Presidential Statement on Signing the Energy 
and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1991, 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1561, 1562 (Nov. 5, 1990). He 
echoed this objection in both of the following two years’ appropriations bills. Presidential Statement 
on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1992, 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1045, 
1046 (Aug. 17, 1991); Presidential Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Act, 1993, 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1736, 1737 (Oct. 2, 1992). 
100 See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 2004, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 1217, 1218 (Sept. 30, 2003) (“The executive branch shall construe these 
provisions relating to planning and making of budget recommendations in a manner consistent with 
the President’s constitutional authority to require the opinions of the heads of the departments and 
to recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the President shall judge necessary 
and expedient.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 
2011 PUB. PAPERS 1568, 1569 (Dec. 23, 2011) (“Additional provisions in this bill . . . purport to 
restrict the use of funds to advance certain legislative positions. I have advised the Congress that I 
will not construe these provisions as preventing me from fulfilling my constitutional responsibility 
to recommend to the Congress’s consideration such measures as I shall judge necessary and 
expedient.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, 2017 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 312 (May 5, 2017) (“Because the Constitution gives the President the 
authority to recommend “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” (Article II, 
section 3), my Administration will continue to treat these, and similar provisions, as advisory and 
non-binding.”). 
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use of funds to develop recommendations frustrates the President’s ability to 
fulfill his positive duty to develop and transmit to Congress recommended 
measures he judges necessary and expedient.101 
2. Triggering Laws 
Triggering laws, on the other hand, compel executive recommendations. 
Objections to triggering laws therefore do not argue that they frustrate the 
President’s ability to recommend measures, but rather that, by dictating the 
timing and topic of the recommendation, they frustrate his ability to judge 
which measures are necessary and expedient.102 While the OLC traced the 
origin of triggering laws to a 1948 law that required the President to 
“recommend to the Congress legislation with respect to the disposal of the 
Government-owned rubber-producing facilities,”103 I identified triggering 
laws dating back as far as 1941.104 All of these bills were signed into law without 
objection from the sitting President, and the same was true for a number of 
other triggering laws signed by Presidents in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.105 
The OLC first articulated its objection to triggering laws in 1981, 
declaring that “‘a statutory direction to the President to include any particular 
request in the budget he submits to Congress would be of doubtful 
constitutionality’ under the Recommendations Clause.”106 This position has 
been echoed in different legislative contexts by each president since.107 The 
 
101 See 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *3 (“[W]e have maintained for over half a 
century that Congress may not enact statutes, commonly known as ‘muzzling laws,’ that purport 
to prevent the President from recommending legislation he thinks necessary and expedient.” 
(citations omitted)). 
102 See id. at 9 (“Laws purporting to compel the President to recommend legislation to 
Congress, regardless of whether the President judges the enactment of such legislation necessary or 
expedient, would prevent the President from fulfilling that obligation, by requiring the President to 
recommend legislation that he has not judged necessary and expedient.”). 
103 Id. at 15-16 (quoting The Rubber Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-469, § 9(a), 62 Stat. 101, 105). 
The OLC identified an earlier possible triggering law in a 1921 budget law that required the 
president to “transmit to Congress on the first day of each regular session, the Budget” including 
“[e]stimates of the expenditures and appropriations necessary in [the president’s] judgment for the 
support of the Government for the ensuing fiscal year,” but concluded it provided enough discretion 
that it did not infringe on the president’s ability to judge what measures were necessary and 
expedient. Id. at 15 (quoting The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 201(a), 42 
Stat. 20). 
104 See infra Section III.C. for a detailed discussion of early historical practice regarding 
triggering laws. 
105 See infra Section III.C. 
106 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *13 (citing Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel to Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Leg. Affairs 1 (Oct. 9, 1981)). 
107 See e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, 1988 PUB. PAPERS 1284, 1284-85 (Oct. 5, 1988) (“[T]he Act 
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thrust of the argument is that, by assigning the President the duty to 
recommend “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,”108 the 
Recommendations Clause “assigns the President the ‘exclusive[]’ . . . 
responsibility to decide which measures the President shall recommend to 
Congress.”109 Therefore, “Congress may not command the President to 
exercise that discretion in a particular circumstance” without trespassing on 
the separation of powers.110 Administrations are more or less aggressive in 
how they state this argument in DOJ views letters depending on the 
substance of the triggering law in question and whether the bill is pending or 
has already been passed by Congress. For example, the Trump 
Administration’s DOJ views letters often state bluntly that a triggering law 
“contravenes” or “violates” the President’s power under the 
Recommendations Clause, whereas the administration’s signing statements 
more often vaguely state the administration’s intention to treat the triggering 
law “in a manner consistent with” the Recommendations Clause.111 
 
also purports to require the Secretary of the Interior to transmit to the Congress a report with 
legislative recommendations . . . . Because the Constitution grants the President authority to 
recommend such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, this provision must be 
construed as advisory rather than mandatory.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the Support for 
East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1596, 1597 (Nov. 28, 1989) 
(“Other sections of the Act also require the President to submit . . . his recommendations. The 
Constitution grants exclusively to the President the power to recommend for the consideration of 
the Congress such measures as he judges necessary and expedient . . . . [S]uch provisions have 
always been treated as advisory rather than mandatory.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the 
Oceans Act of 2000, 2000 PUB. PAPERS 1574, 1574 (Aug. 7, 2000) (“[The act] states that the President 
‘shall submit to Congress a statement of proposals to implement or respond to the Commission’s 
recommendations’ . . . . [T]o avoid any infringement on the President’s” Recommendations Clause 
prerogatives, “I construe section 4(a) not to extend to the submission of proposals or responses that 
the President finds it unnecessary or inexpedient to present.”); Presidential Statement on Signing 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 2006 PUB. PAPERS 1523, 1523-24 (Aug. 17, 2006) (“The executive 
branch shall construe [the Act] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and to recommend for the consideration of the 
Congress such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient.”); Presidential 
Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, 2009 PUB. PAPERS 216, 217 (March 
11, 2009) (“[T]he Act . . . effectively purport[s] to require me and other executive officers to submit 
budget requests to the Congress in particular forms. Because the Constitution gives the President 
the discretion to recommend only ‘such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient’ . . . I 
shall treat these directions as precatory.”); Presidential Statement on Signing the DHS Stop Asset 
and Vehicle Excess Act, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 380 (June 6, 2017) (“[The Act] purports to 
require the Under Secretary to recommend budget rescissions to the Congress . . . . My 
Administration . . . will respectfully treat the provision in a manner consistent with [the 
Recommendations Clause], which provides the President the exclusive authority to ‘recommend’ to 
the Congress spending ‘Measures’ in such amounts . . . ’as he shall judge necessary and expedient.’”). 
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
109 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *8. 
110 Id. 
111 Compare, e.g., Views Letter on S. 1591, supra note 58 (stating that a provision requiring a 
recommendation to Congress would “contravene the President’s constitutional authority” under the 
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Today, administrations seek to exercise negative power under the 
Recommendations Clause to escape triggering laws far more than muzzling 
laws. Indeed, according to the results of my search of the American Presidency 
Project archives, Reagan made six signing statements with Recommendations 
Clause objections, and each statement responded to a triggering law.112 The 
same was true of eleven of the thirteen such George H. W. Bush signing 
statements (two objected to muzzling laws), all four of the four such Clinton 
signing statements, sixty of the sixty-one such George W. Bush signing 
statements (four objected to muzzling laws-–some statements contained 
objections to both types of legislation), two of the three such Obama signing 
statements (one objected to a muzzling law), and sixteen of the seventeen such 
Trump signing statements (three objected to muzzling laws).113 
 
Figure 2: Triggering Law Objections Compared to 
All Recommendations Clause Objections  
in Signing Statements 
 
Recommendations Clause); with Presidential Statement on Signing the Substance Use-Disorder 
Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act, 2018 
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 726 (Oct. 24, 2018) (acknowledging that, consistent with the objectives 
of the Act, the administration will, “respectfully treat these provisions in a manner consistent with 
Article II, section 3 of the Constitution, which provides the President the exclusive authority to 
recommend to the Congress only ‘such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.’”). 
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III. THE LIMITS OF NEGATIVE POWER UNDER THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS CLAUSE 
The frequency with which modern presidents use the Recommendations 
Clause as a license to reinterpret triggering laws duly passed by Congress 
demands scrutiny. In this Part, I argue that the scope of negative power under 
the Recommendations Clause is narrower than the interpretation advanced 
by recent administrations and does not reach triggering laws. First, I expand 
on the Medicare law example from the introduction to show how a successful 
exercise of negative executive power under the Recommendations Clause to 
escape a triggering law works. I then argue that such an exercise of negative 
power manifests incorrect constitutional interpretation. Specifically, I start 
with an analytical argument that the “necessary and expedient” modifier in 
the Recommendations Clause is best read to limit the scope of the President’s 
duty to recommend, not to entail exclusive discretion over the timing and 
topic of recommendations. I then contend that neither historical practice of 
administrations before the 1980s nor judicial precedent supports reading the 
Recommendations Clause to confer exclusive discretion either. I argue that 
Congress acts consistent with separation of powers principles and within its 
Article I power when it passes triggering laws. I warn that the prevailing view 
of negative power in the executive branch risks permitting a President to 
bottleneck information necessary to sound lawmaking under the auspices of 
the Recommendations Clause—a clause drafted to prevent just such an 
outcome. I conclude with suggestions on how Congress and future 
administrations should work to correct this false reading of the 
Recommendations Clause.114 
A. Example of Exercising Negative Power Under the Recommendations Clause 
In its 2016 opinion, the OLC argued that a statutory trigger for a 
presidential recommendation should be treated as optional because the 
President’s duty to recommend measures he judges “necessary and expedient” 
entails exclusive discretion over when to make recommendations.115 The law 
in question in that opinion addressed a situation where the portion of 
Medicare expenditures paid for with general revenues, as opposed to 
dedicated Medicare funding, surpasses forty-five percent two years in a row—
 
114 One caveat to all of this is that, even as administrations are wrong to interpret the 
Recommendations Clause as a source of discretion to treat triggering laws as optional, 
administrations should remain free to assert policy objections to them. For example, there is no 
constitutional impediment to an administration sending a DOJ views letter advocating against a 
legislative provision requiring an executive recommendation because it is unnecessary, or 
duplicative, or simply unwise. 
115 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *9. 
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a situation it called a “medicare funding warning.”116 In the event of a 
Medicare funding warning, the law required the President to “submit to 
Congress, within the 15-day period beginning on the date of the budget 
submission to Congress . . . for the succeeding year, proposed legislation to 
respond to such warning.”117 President George W. Bush issued a signing 
statement declaring his Administration’s intent to construe this requirement 
“in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority” under 
the Recommendations Clause,118 but he went on to comply with the 
requirement by submitting legislation to Congress in response to a Medicare 
funding warning.119 
President Obama, however, did not submit legislation to Congress, 
despite annual Medicare funding warnings from 2007 to 2013.120 It is arguable 
that President Obama nevertheless fulfilled his obligations under the statute 
 
116 31 U.S.C. § 1105(h)(1) (2018). 
117 Id. (citing MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 801(a)(2), (c)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2357 (2003)). 
Interestingly, this provision was only added through the conference report—neither the House-
passed nor the Senate-passed versions of the bill contained it. Compare Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1 (2003) (as passed by the House, June 27, 2003) 
(lacking the requirement); and id. (as passed by the Senate, July 7, 2003) (same); with Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 801(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2357 (containing the requirement). This is technically a violation 
of conference committee rules; new matter may not be added to a bill. See RULES OF THE HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXII(9), H.R. DOC. 115-177, at 945 (2d Sess. 2019) (“[A] conference 
report may not include matter not committed to the conference committee by either House . . . .”); 
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XXVIII(3)(a), S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 40 (1st Sess. 2013) 
(“Conferees shall not insert in their report matter not committed to them by either House . . . .”). 
However, this rule is only enforced by a member raising a point of order, and therefore it is 
commonly waived. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XXII(10)(a)(1), H.R. 
DOC. 115-177, at 948 (2d Sess. 2019) (“A Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner may raise a 
point of order against nongermane matter . . . .”); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule 
XXVIII(3)(c), S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 40 (1st Sess. 2013) (“If new matter is inserted in the report, a 
point of order may be made against the conference report and it shall be disposed of . . . .”); see also 
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-708, CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
DELIBERATIONS 2 (2008) (“The point to remember is that these few rules [pertaining to 
conferencing] can be waived or not be invoked in either chamber.”). 
118 Presidential Statement on Signing the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, 2003 PUB. PAPERS 1698, 1698 (Dec. 8, 2003). 
119 See HINDA CHAIKIND, JIM HAHN, JENNIFER O’SULLIVAN & HENRY COHEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34407, THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO THE 
MEDICARE FUNDING WARNING 1 (2008); see also 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *2 (stating 
that President Bush did submit legislation in compliance with the Medicare law). 
120 See PATRICIA A. DAVIS, TODD GARVEY & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS22796, MEDICARE TRIGGER 5 (2018) (“Although the Medicare trustees issued warnings 
each year from 2007 through 2013, no additional legislative proposals have been submitted to 
Congress pursuant to Section 802.”); see also THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. 
SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. FUNDS, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 185 (2017) (“The Trustees made 
determinations of excess general revenue Medicare funding in each of the reports for 2006 through 
2013. Two consecutive such determinations trigger a Medicare funding warning. The 2007 through 
2013 reports thus prompted Medicare funding warnings.”). 
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in 2010 through various proposals included in his budget submission to 
address the funding shortfall.121 Regardless, the Obama Administration took 
a different approach than the Bush Administration by not forming and 
recommending targeted legislation to Congress, and it felt free to take that 
approach based on discretion it read into the Recommendations Clause. 
President Obama’s 2010 budget submission stated that, “[i]n accordance with 
the Recommendations Clause . . . the President considers this requirement 
[to recommend legislation in response to a Medicare funding warning] to be 
advisory and not binding.”122 It repeated a version of this position in 
subsequent budget submissions.123 
This exercise of discretion was important to members of Congress. In a 
2011 letter to the President demanding that he “submit a legislative proposal 
to Congress in response to the Medicare funding warning,” forty-four 
senators stated flatly: “[y]our administration is currently in violation of [the 
Medicare law].”124 Another 2011 letter from Representative Paul Ryan and 
Senator Jeff Sessions decried how the administration was “ignoring the law” 
by “not even acknowledg[ing] the existence of the Medicare funding warning” 
in its budget.125 In 2013, eight senators sent another letter expressing concern 
 
121 President Obama’s first budget submission argued that the Administration had abided by 
the letter of the law because “the President has put forth Budget proposals that would save Medicare 
$92.3 billion over five years and $287.5 billion over ten years. They would also save about $49.9 billion 
in 2014 and bring the share of Medicare funded by general revenues below 45 percent.” 2010 
BUDGET, supra note 10, at 197. The budget proposal also implicitly suggested that, even if these 
budget proposals did not amount to “legislation” under the statute, they did amount to 
recommended “measures” sufficient to discharge the President’s duty under the Recommendations 
Clause. “The President believes that enactment of these submitted measures would address the 
warning conditions.” Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
122 Id. at 197. 
123 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 66 (2012); OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: 
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 57 (2013); OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 30 (2014); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 30 (2015). However, none of these budget submissions 
contained the language from the 2010 budget submission stating that the budget proposals taken as 
a whole “address the warning conditions” by “bring[ing] the share of Medicare funded by general 
revenues below 45 percent.” 2010 BUDGET, supra note 10, at 197, 196. 
124 Letter from U.S. Sens. to Barack Obama, U.S. Pres. (June 15, 2011), 
https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Zients%20Medicare%20trigger%20letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X45M-ULUC]. 
125 Letter from Paul Ryan, U.S. Rep., & Jeff Sessions, U.S. Sen., to Barack Obama, U.S. Pres. 
(June 14, 2011), https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Zients%20Medicare%20trigger% 
20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/X45M-ULUC]. Ironically, Senator Sessions would go on to become 
Attorney General of a DOJ that repeatedly advanced the interpretation of the Recommendations 
Clause he repudiated in this letter. See e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views 
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that “[t]he administration has failed each of the last four years to respond to 
these funding warnings despite receiving several communications from 
Congress urging them to comply with this unambiguous legal 
requirement.”126 The Obama Administration did not change positions in 
response to these letters. 
Setting aside the political gamesmanship of this episode,127 the upshot is 
that Congress passed legislation requiring the President to respond to a 
defined threat to Medicare’s solvency with a legislative recommendation, and 
the President relied on the Recommendations Clause to reinterpret that 
requirement. President Trump has followed suit following the first Medicare 
funding warning of his administration. Issued in 2018, the warning triggered 
the requirement to submit a responsive legislative recommendation to 
Congress within fifteen days after he submitted his Fiscal Year 2020 
Budget.128 President Trump submitted that budget on March 11, 2019, but did 
not submit any recommended legislation within fifteen days.129 Instead, the 
budget stated that, “[i]n accordance with the Recommendations Clause of the 
 
Letter on H.R. 654, the Pacific Northwest Earthquake Preparedness Act of 2017 (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/969271/download [https://perma.cc/76TS-ER27] (expressing 
the view of the Justice Department under Attorney General Sessions that “it would advise the 
Administration to treat as advisory and non-binding one provision in the bill that would require the 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) and a presidentially 
appointed task force to recommend legislative measures to Congress in violation of the 
Recommendations Clause”). 
126 Letter from U.S. Senators to Jeffrey Zients, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Feb. 
4, 2013), https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Zients%20Medicare%20trigger% 
20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/XX97-3SG9]. 
127 The Medicare funding warning provision was likely included in the bill to mollify 
concerned Republicans during an intense battle to pass it—a battle in which President Bush was 
deeply involved. Thomas R. Oliver, Philip R. Lee & Helene L. Lipton, A Political History of Medicare 
and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283, 329 (2004) (explaining the political dynamics of 
the fight to pass the bill and the ways “President Bush invested his political capital” to pass the 
Medicare bill). Once a Democrat won the presidency, Republican members of Congress used the 
provision to argue that President Obama was not serious about reigning in the deficit and securing 
the future of Medicare. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Sens. to Barack Obama, U.S. Pres., supra note 
124; Letter from Paul Ryan, U.S. Rep., & Jeff Sessions, U.S. Sen., to Barack Obama, U.S. Pres., 
supra note 125. 
128 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TR. 
FUNDS, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2018) (“[A] Medicare funding warning is triggered and . . . the 
President must submit to Congress proposed legislation to respond to the warning within 15 days 
after the submission of the Fiscal Year 2020 Budget.”) (emphasis omitted). 
129 During the same period of time, however, the Trump Administration sent a report to 
Congress pursuant to another section of the Medicare law. See 165 CONG. REC. S1658 (daily ed. 
March 5, 2019) (Executive Communication 484) (providing notice to the Senate Committee on 
Finance of a “communication from the Assistant Secretary for Legislation, Department of Health 
and Human Services, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled ‘Finalizing Medicare 
Regulations under Section 902 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 For Calendar Year 2018’”). 
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Constitution, and as the Executive Branch has noted in prior years, the 
Executive Branch considers [the requirement to recommend legislation in 
response to a Medicare funding warning] to be advisory.”130 
B. “Necessary and Expedient” 
The 2016 OLC opinion justifying the Obama Administration’s 
reinterpretation of the Medicare law argued that, because the law “requires 
the President to recommend that Congress enact legislation . . . regardless of 
whether the President judges any such legislation necessary and expedient,” 
it “contravenes the Recommendations Clause and may be treated as advisory 
and non-binding.”131 President Obama, and later President Trump, did not 
deem it necessary and expedient to recommend discrete legislation 
responding to Medicare funding warnings, so they did not recommend any.132 
Yet, the Framers made recommending legislation to Congress a presidential 
duty of constitutional dimension. It is implausible that, in the same breath, 
they meant to provide the President a tool to escape that duty. The better 
reading of the Recommendations Clause identifies “necessary and expedient” 
not as conferring discretion to ignore statutory demands for executive input, 
but rather simply as establishing a limit on the scope of the President’s 
positive duty to make recommendations. 
Reading “necessary and expedient” as a limitation on the scope of the 
President’s duty makes analytical sense. According to J. Gregory Sidak, the 
only commentator to comprehensively study the Recommendations Clause, 
the Framers likely presumed that only “serious proposals advanced by the 
President” would provoke the type of congressional “umbrage or cavil” they 
sought to prevent.133 Therefore, there was no need to make it the duty of the 
President to make recommendations beyond those he judged necessary and 
expedient because the President would not face the same political 
consequences for making minor recommendations. As the Congressional 
Research Service summarized in a brief on the Medicare law: 
[T]he text of the [Recommendations Clause], read in conjunction with 
analogous case law, does not appear to support an interpretation that would 
prevent Congress from directing the President to submit legislative 
recommendations. The clause is perhaps most accurately characterized as 
establishing a right as opposed to a substantive source of authority—ensuring 
that the President may submit directly to Congress legislative proposals that 
 
130 2020 BUDGET, supra note 10, at 23. 
131 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *1, *15. 
132 See supra Section III.A. 
133 Sidak, supra note 11, at 2082 (quotation omitted). 
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he views as “necessary and expedient.” Thus, this right would appear only to 
be infringed where Congress prevents the President from submitting his own 
legislative proposal or attempts to dictate the contents of a required 
legislative proposal. Under this reading, it is unlikely that Congress imposes 
an excessive burden on the President where it merely directs the President to 
submit a proposal, the contents of which remain within the President’s 
discretion, in response to a specific trigger.134 
As outlined in Section I.A, it is incorrect to say the Recommendations 
Clause merely establishes a right. It establishes a duty by its text: the 
President shall recommend measures. Functionally, however, given the 
discretion of the President to set the scope of that duty according to his belief 
about what is necessary and expedient, as discussed in Section I.B, the 
characterization of the duty to recommend as a right works to show that it is 
not a “substantive source of authority.” 
The somewhat amorphous duty to recommend measures to Congress also 
requires the “necessary and expedient” limitation to make it administrable. 
Without further definition, a bare duty to “recommend measures” to 
Congress would be vague to the point of meaninglessness. It could be 
construed so narrowly as to require little more than stray utterances in the 
direction of Capitol Hill. On the other extreme, to the extent that failure to 
perform a constitutionally prescribed duty is an impeachable offense,135 an 
ambitious Congress could find continuing grounds for removal in a limitless 
duty to recommend. 
History also counsels against the interpretation of “necessary and 
expedient” advanced by recent administrations: that the Framers and early 
scholars regarded the Recommendations Clause as generally uncontroversial 
suggests it was not meant to confer exclusive powers on the President. 
Alexander Hamilton said of Article II, Section 3 in Federalist 77, “no objection 
has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly admit of 
any.”136 Indeed, there is no record of debate over the wisdom of the clause at 
the Constitutional Convention beyond the adoption, without objection, of 
Gouverneur Morris’s amendment to change “may” to “shall”.137 As Justice 
Story put it: 
[T]he president’s giving information and recommending measures to 
congress, is so consonant with the structure of the executive departments of 
the colonial and state governments, with the usages and practice of other free 
 
134 DAVIS, GARVEY & DAVIS, supra note 120, at 6 (citations omitted). 
135 See Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 11 (“A President who flouted the executive duty of 
[the Recommendations Clause] would properly be subject to impeachment . . . .”). 
136 THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1941). 
137 Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 5-6; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 20, at 404–05. 
796 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 769 
governments, with the general convenience of congress, and with a due share 
of responsibility on the part of the executive, that it may well be presumed 
to be above all real objection.138 
The Recommendations Clause’s easy path was likely due at least in part 
to its familiarity: the New York Constitution of 1777 provided a model for the 
Recommendations Clause.139 The New York Constitution declared “[t]hat it 
shall be the duty of the Governor to inform the legislature, at every session, 
of the condition of the State, so far as may respect his department; to 
recommend such matters to their consideration as shall appear to him to 
concern its good government, welfare, and prosperity.”140 The New York 
Constitution was ratified in the midst of a violent revolution to throw off the 
yoke of a tyrannical king, a fact certainly not lost on its drafters whose work 
was repeatedly delayed by movements to escape the fighting.141 Despite “the 
convention’s desire to avoid . . . a governor with too much legislative power,” 
it ratified the state Constitution, including its version of the 
Recommendations Clause, 31–1.142 And by the time of the next full state 
constitutional convention in 1821, the text was amended to expand the scope 
of the governor’s duty: rather than limiting recommendations to matters that 
concern the state’s “good government, welfare, and prosperity,” the 1821 
Constitution required the governor to recommend any matters he deemed 
“expedient.”143 Somewhere along the way, the clause would have faced at least 
 
138 3 STORY, supra note 25, at 412. The state constitutions, and especially the New York 
Constitution, heavily influenced the Framers in Philadelphia. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 128-29 (1913) (explaining that “the state constitutions 
were continually drawn upon,” and that the New York Constitution of 1777 “seems to have been used 
more extensively than any other . . . . especially in connection with the executive.”) It is likely no 
accident that Gouverneur Morris was the one to propose changing “may” to “shall” at the Philadelphia 
Convention, as he played a major role in framing the New York Constitution. PETER J. GALIE & 
CHRISTOPHER BOPST, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION 3 (2d ed. 2012). 
139 Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 9 (describing the Recommendations Clause in the 
New York Constitution of 1777 as a “precursor” to that in federal constitution based on their 
“mirrored” language). 
140 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, too, at least gestured 
in the direction of a duty to recommend. It gave authority to a Council of Censors, created to 
preserve the constitution and ensure proper performance of the executive and legislature, “to 
recommend to the Legislature the repealing such laws as appear to them to have been enacted 
contrary to the principles of the Constitution.” PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47. 
141 GALIE & BOPST, supra note 138, at 5. 
142 Id. at 6, 9. 
143 N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. III, § 4. It is possible that New York substituted in the “expedient” 
modifier simply to put it more in line with the language of the federal Constitution. However, it 
did not accept the additional “necessary” modifier included in the federal Constitution. To the extent 
that a matter can be expedient without being necessary, this change still expanded the governor’s 
duty under the Recommendations Clause. See Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 11, at 61 (“Indeed, there 
is a sense in which judging what is necessary is different from judging what is expedient. For 
example, something may be necessary but inexpedient, or expedient but unnecessary.”). 
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some opposition if it was thought to concentrate executive power vis-à-vis the 
legislature.144 Instead, it became the model for the Recommendations Clause 
included in the federal constitution, and the amendment to substitute “may” 
with “shall” was made by Gouverneur Morris, a New York delegate who was 
instrumental in drafting the state’s constitution.145 
Thoughts of executive tyranny and revolution likewise influenced debates 
around the framing and ratification of the federal constitution. To be sure, 
many of those who came to be known as federalists were primarily concerned 
about the accrual of too much power in the legislature, a sentiment which 
fueled their hard-fought victory to include the veto power in the 
Constitution.146 But that fear was reactive, largely born of a perception that 
the Framers’ preoccupation with circumscribing executive power would have 
unintended consequences. For example, James Madison, writing just a few 
months after the Convention signed its proposed Constitution, warned in 
Federalist 48 that “[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the 
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.”147 But 
his warning had roots in a perception that the Framers’ focus on containing 
executive power crowded out deliberation on the proper role of the 
legislature. The Framers, he wrote, 
seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty 
from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary 
magistrate . . . . They seem never to have recollected the danger from 
legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, 
must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.”148 
It seems unlikely that delegates so concerned about executive power would 
have adopted the Recommendations Clause without recorded debate if it was 
understood to entail executive power broad enough to preclude Congress 
from using its legislative power to seek executive recommendations.149 
 
144 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton played to New York’s revolutionary fear of monarchy to defend 
the veto and secure support for ratification in Federalist 69 : “The qualified negative of the President 
differs widely from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the 
revisionary authority of the council of revision of [New York], of which the governor is a constituent 
part.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1941). 
145 GALIE & BOPST, supra note 138, at 3. 
146 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Modern 
Library ed., 1941) (“We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement 
of the legislative at the expense of the other departments.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 476 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1941) (noting “[t]he propensity of the legislative 
department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments”). 
147 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 322 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1941). 
148 Id. 
149 Debate over the veto power, for example, was fierce. See Carl McGowan, President’s Veto Power: 
An Important Instrument of Conflict in Our Constitutional System, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 791, 797-98 
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On its own terms, and in light of the history of the Recommendations 
Clause, the “necessary and expedient” modifier is properly read as a limitation 
on the scope of the President’s affirmative duty to recommend, not a grant of 
discretion precluding enforcement of triggering laws. 
C. Historical Practice 
The OLC relies heavily on historical practice to determine constitutional 
meaning with respect to presidential powers and duties.150 Accordingly, it 
asserted in its 2016 opinion that “longstanding historical practice” supports 
its conclusion that triggering laws interfere with presidential discretion under 
the Recommendations Clause.151 But it relied only on historical practice since 
1981, the year when the OLC first articulated this view of the 
Recommendations Clause.152 Importantly, between the 1940s, when Congress 
began passing triggering laws, and 1981, the OLC conceded it was “unaware 
of an instance . . . in which the Executive Branch lodged an objection to [a 
triggering law] on Recommendations Clause grounds.”153 
My research confirms that, for as long as the executive branch has objected 
to triggering laws on Recommendations Clause grounds, it has accepted them 
as valid for longer. In 1941, Congress passed a law providing that, if the 
President concludes an executive office should be eliminated, “he shall report 
his conclusions to Congress with such recommendations as he may deem 
proper.”154 There is no evidence of executive branch objection to this law. While 
the “as he may deem proper” qualifier could be construed as allowing enough 
discretion to avoid conflict with the Recommendations Clause as interpreted 
by today’s OLC, recent administrations have objected to similarly relaxed 
formulations.155 Regardless, a superficial search shows triggering laws were both 
common and signed without objection during this era. For example, the 
 
(1986) (“[An] antifederalist author attacked the veto power as a violation of the separation of powers. 
‘It is . . . a political error of the greatest magnitude,’ he wrote, ‘to allow the executive power a negative, 
or in fact any kind of control over the proceedings of the legislature.’” (citation omitted)). 
150 See, e.g., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C., 2011 WL 1459998, at *7 
(April 1, 2011) (explaining, in the national defense context, that “two centuries of practice . . . . is an 
important indication of constitutional meaning, because it reflects the two political branches’ 
practical understanding, developed since the founding of the Republic, of their respective roles and 
responsibilities”). 
151 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *6, *8. 
152 See id. at *13 (“Beginning in 1981 . . . the Executive began to object to [triggering laws].”). 
153 Id. at *13. 
154 The War Powers Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 4, 55 Stat. 838, 839. 
155 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter on S. 1494, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Mar. 15, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/files/ola/legacy/2010/04/05/031510-ltr-feinstein-bond-re-hr2701-s1494-intel-auth-bills.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PGE2-G9JZ] (objecting to a provision requiring the President to submit to 
Congress an “assessment of the need for any modification of this title” (emphasis added)). 
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President did not object to a 1946 triggering law requiring the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy to “submit to the Congress a joint 
recommendation for revision of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942.”156 
Interestingly, this law arguably went so far as to dictate the content of that 
recommendation, requiring that it contain specific “recommendations with 
respect to increases authorized for flying pay, parachute pay, glider pay, 
submarine pay, and similar special pay and allowances.”157 
A triggering law passed a few years later offers another useful, if somewhat 
byzantine, case study. The law, passed in 1952 without Recommendations 
Clause objection, was aimed at improving water research and development 
by, among other things, requiring the Secretary of the Interior to “make 
reports to the President and the Congress at the beginning of each regular 
session of the action taken or instituted by him under the provisions of this 
Act” and further requiring that “[t]he report shall include suitable 
recommendations for further legislation.”158 That section was superseded in 
1961 by another triggering law, also passed without presidential objection, 
which instead required that the Secretary “recommend to the Congress from 
time to time authorization for construction and operation, or for participation 
in the construction and operation, of a demonstration plant for any process 
which he determines” will advance the goal of producing water suitable for 
consumption, agriculture, and research.159 That law was updated by a 1967 law 
replacing the language “demonstration” plant with “prototype” plant,160 
which in turn was superseded by a 1971 law, also passed without 
Recommendations Clause objection, instead directing the Secretary to 
“report to the President and to the Congress . . . his recommendation as to 
the best opportunity for the early construction of a large-scale prototype 
desalting plant.”161 
The 1971 law was repealed and replaced by a 1978 law that excluded the 
triggering provision,162 but the Water Desalination Act of 1996 revived it, 
requiring the Secretary to “recommend to Congress desalination 
demonstration projects or full-scale desalination projects.”163 President 
Clinton did not issue a signing statement on that legislation, nor does he 
appear to have objected to it in other writings or speeches. In 2016, Congress 
 
156 First Supplemental Surplus Appropriation Rescission Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-301, 60 
Stat. 6, 20-21. 
157 Id. at 21. 
158 Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-448, § 6, 66 Stat. 328, 329. 
159 Act of Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-295, § 2(c), 75 Stat. 628, 628. 
160 Act of June 24, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-30, 81 Stat. 78, 77. 
161 Act of July 29, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-60, § 4(b), 85 Stat. 159, 160. 
162 Water Research and Development Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-467, §§ 201, 410(a), 92 Stat. 
1305, 1310, 1316. 
163 Water Desalination Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-298, § 3(b), 110 Stat. 3622, 3623. 
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passed a bill reauthorizing that 1996 law.164 While it made a number of 
amendments to the law’s text, it left the triggering provision intact.165 
President Obama issued a signing statement on the law, but it made no 
mention of the Recommendations Clause.166 
The bottom line is that Congress passed a triggering law in 1952 and 
passed new laws recreating that triggering law in different forms five times 
across six decades and as many presidents, but nowhere along the way did the 
executive branch raise Recommendations Clause concerns. In conjunction 
with the fact that the executive branch did not publicly raise such concerns 
about any of the other triggering laws I identified that were passed before the 
1980s,167 this is inconsistent with the OLC’s assertion that objecting to 
triggering laws on Recommendations Clause grounds is the executive branch’s 
longstanding historical practice. Historical practice, at least before 1981, 
instead supports reading triggering laws as consistent with any discretion 
committed to the President under the Recommendations Clause. 
 
164 The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, § 3801, 
130 Stat. 1628, 1846-47 (2016). 
165 Id. The current U.S. Code contains the full text of the triggering provision from the 1996 
law verbatim. 42 U.S.C. § 10301 note (2018). 
166 See Presidential Statement on Signing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the 
Nation Act, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 852 (Dec. 16, 2016). 
167 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 513(b), 
88 Stat. 829, 897 (requiring the Secretary of Labor to submit a report to Congress containing 
“recommendations” from an advisory council created by the law and “recommendations for further 
legislation . . . as he may find advisable”); Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 502(c), 88 Stat. 297, 321 (requiring the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget to submit “conclusions and recommendations” to Congress based on a 
joint study conducted with the Congressional Budget Office); Egg Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 91-597, § 26, 84 Stat. 1620, 1634 (1970) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to “submit to the 
Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture and 
Forestry of the Senate a comprehensive and detailed written report” that includes 
“recommendations for legislation” to improve certain programs); Vocational Education 
Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-576, § 306, 82 Stat. 1064, 1097 (requiring the Commissioner 
of Education to “submit to the Congress a report on the results of [a study required under the law] 
and any recommendations for legislation which would facilitate consolidation of education 
programs”); Act of Sept. 20, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-593, § 5(d), 80 Stat. 815, 820 (requiring that 
commissions consisting of members appointed by the President transmit a report to Congress 
including “specific recommendations” pertaining to certain provisions of the law); United States 
Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-402, § 603, 62 Stat. 6, 11 
(requiring that commissions consisting of members appointed by the President transmit to Congress 
a report “including appraisals, where feasible, as to the effectiveness of [certain] programs, and such 
recommendations as shall have been made by the Commissions to the Secretary for effectuating the 
purposes and objectives of this Act and the action taken to carry out such recommendations”). 
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D. Judicial Precedent 
To reconcile the conflicting pre- and post-1981 executive branch positions 
on triggering laws, it is useful to look to the only branch without an 
institutional interest in the scope of the Recommendations Clause. The 
judiciary has not weighed in on this scope question directly. However, a few 
opinions do bear indirectly on the question, and they do not support reading 
the Clause as a grant of broad discretion to the President. 
The most direct judicial consideration of the question came in Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. National Emergency Policy Development Group, which involved a 
dispute over the publication of information related to a presidential task force 
on energy policy.168 In that case, the D.C. District Court described the 
“stunning” implications of “the position taken by the government . . . that 
any infringement on any enumerated power in Article II is necessarily a per 
se violation of the Constitution.”169 It noted that “the Supreme Court has 
never agreed” with that position, and declared it “untenable” that “[a]ny 
action by Congress or the Judiciary that intrudes on the president’s ability to 
recommend legislation to Congress or get advice from Cabinet members in 
any way would necessarily violate the Constitution.”170 “Clearly,” the court 
concluded, “this is not the law.”171 
The D.C. Circuit implied the same in National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Nixon.172 That case concerned a law that established a commission to make 
recommendations regarding the compensation of certain government officials 
and required the President to adjust pay accordingly or else submit alternative 
recommendations to Congress.173 Although without reference to the 
Recommendations Clause, the court held that “the President has a 
constitutional duty forthwith to grant . . . the federal pay increase mandated 
by the Congress.”174 Specifically, it found: 
[T]he President failed to submit an alternative plan to Congress[,] . . . a plan 
he was required to submit if he desired to change or delay the otherwise 
required pay adjustments . . . . After the President received the necessary 
 
168 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2002). 
169 Id. at 49. 
170 Id. at 49-50. 
171 Id. at 50. 
172 492 F.2d 587, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
173 Id. (“[O]nce the necessary comparability studies are completed and a certain report, 
findings and recommendations are sent to the President, the President has discretion not to adjust 
pay in accord with the dictates of Section 5305(a)(2) only if he has timely submitted an alternative 
plan to Congress.”) (emphasis added). 
174 Id. at 616.  
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comparability studies [from the commission], his obligation to adjust pay 
under the [law] was mandatory, involving no discretion.175 
Thus, the court did not see the Recommendations Clause as an impediment 
to enforcing a law requiring the President to submit a recommendation to 
Congress or else make pay adjustments. 
The D.C. District and Circuit courts also indirectly addressed the 
question in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton.176 That 
case involved a dispute over whether a presidential task force and working 
group should be subject to a law requiring meetings of “advisory committees” 
to be public, and if so whether the law unconstitutionally encroaches on the 
President’s power under the Recommendations Clause.177 The district court 
decided both questions in the affirmative, explaining that because the law 
“open[s] the advice and recommendation sessions of the advisory committee 
to the public, they would affect the candor with which the committee’s 
members deliberate their findings and proposals. This prevents the President 
from receiving the advice he needs to recommend legislation to the 
Congress.”178 
The D.C. Circuit reversed on grounds that the task force and working 
group were not in fact “advisory committees,” but it also provided detailed 
analysis on the Recommendations Clause question.179 It paraphrased the 
government’s argument that “this clause gives the President the sole 
discretion to decide what measures to propose to Congress, and it leaves no 
room for congressional interference”180 before finding that “[t]he 
government’s focus on the Recommendation Clause seems somewhat 
artificial.”181 The court objected to the government’s expansive reading of the 
clause because “[d]iscussions on policy . . . to some extent always implicate 
proposed legislation.”182 It held that, while the requirement to make task force 
 
175 Id. at 601 (emphasis added). 
176 813 F. Supp. 82, 84 (D.D.C.), rev’d, 997 F.2d 898, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
177 Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, 813 F. Supp. 82, at 84. 
178 Id. at 93. 
179 Ass’n of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, 997 F.2d at 900. 
180 Id. at 906. 
181 Id. at 908. 
182 Id. The court expanded: 
Whenever an executive branch group considers policy initiatives, it discusses 
interchangeably new legislation, executive orders, or other administrative directives. 
Thus, virtually anytime an advisory group meets to discuss a problem, it will implicate 
the Recommendation Clause, from which all executive branch authority to 
recommend legislation derives. Accordingly, if the application of [the law requiring 
public meetings] to groups advising the President or anyone else in the executive 
branch were constitutionally problematic, insofar as those groups were advising on 
proposed legislation, [the law] would be problematic with regard to virtually all policy 
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and working group meetings public infringed on executive privilege over 
confidential communications, it did not impede his ability to recommend 
legislation.183 Thus, while this case did not involve a triggering law, the 
Court’s reasoning does suggest a preference for a narrow interpretation of 
executive discretion under the Recommendations Clause. 
E. Separation of Powers and the Exclusivity of Discretion to Recommend 
Separation of powers principles also counsel against reading the duty to 
recommend as conferring exclusive discretion to the President over the 
timing and topic of recommendations. In his canonical concurrence in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson laid out three situations 
in which a President exercises power. In the first, he “acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress” and his authority is thus “at its 
maximum.”184 In the second, he “acts in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority” and “there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority,” so “any actual test of power is likely 
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.”185 In the third, he “takes measures 
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” and thus his 
“power is at its lowest ebb.”186 
The President operates in the third situation when he ignores a duly 
passed triggering law. In this situation, according to Justice Jackson, “[c]ourts 
can sustain exclusive Presidential control . . . only by disabling the Congress 
from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at 
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”187 Indeed, 
to support this proposition Justice Jackson cited Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States, in which the Court held that the President acted outside his power in 
firing a Federal Trade Commission commissioner in contravention of a 
statute regulating commissioner removal.188 The Court in Humphrey’s 
Executor found it “plain under the Constitution that illimitable power of 
removal is not possessed by the President . . . .”189 
 
advice. Under that reasoning [the law] would be constitutionally suspect on its face—
an argument the government declined to make. 
Id. 
183 Id. at 909. 
184 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
185 Id. at 637. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 637-38. 
188 Id. at 637-38 & n.4. 
189 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).  
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While a vast and interesting body of scholarship has developed around 
analyzing the Youngstown framework,190 it suffices for now to note that the 
OLC’s expansive view of negative power under the Recommendations Clause 
is inconsistent with the separation-of-powers principles the framework 
expresses. The OLC argued bluntly in its 2016 opinion that all Article II 
powers are exclusive and therefore simply untouchable by Congress,191 but 
the Youngstown framework calls for cautious scrutiny to protect the 
“equilibrium established by our constitutional system” when the executive 
acts contrary to the expressed will of Congress192—like when he ignores a 
duly passed triggering law. 
1. Proper Congressional Action 
Cautious scrutiny is thus required where a President seeks to escape a 
triggering law. Under the Youngstown framework, the constitutionality of this 
action hinges on whether “it can be supported only by any remainder of 
executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over 
the subject.”193 The Supreme Court, while recognizing that the contours of 
executive, legislative, and judicial power are not “neatly defined,”194 has 
created a two-prong test to determine whether an act of Congress 
impermissibly encroaches on executive power. First, it requires a threshold 
inquiry into “the extent to which [the act of Congress] prevents the 
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned 
functions.”195 Where the “potential for disruption” of executive functions is 
present, the second prong of the test balances “whether that impact is 
 
190 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 95 (2002) (arguing that the Youngstown framework “places too much reliance on 
courts to police executive action by locating ill-defined boundaries between categories that turn on 
Congress’s implied will; and too little reliance on courts to identify and limit presidential powers 
based on inferences from the text and structure of the Constitution”); Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 99 
(2006) (asserting that the Youngstown framework is an “empty vessel”); Edward T. Swaine, The 
Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 339 (2010) (contending that the Youngstown 
framework affects how the three branches act in relation to each other, and “tends to disserve the 
institution it is thought to benefit: Congress”). 
191 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *9 (arguing that “where Article II assigns a duty to 
the President, the President alone has discretion to execute that duty, and Congress may not 
command the President to exercise that discretion in a particular circumstance”). 
192 343 U.S. at 638. 
193 Id. at 640. 
194 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997). 
195 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443, to find that the independent counsel provision 
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 does not “disrupt[] the proper balance between the 
coordinate branches [by] prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions”). 
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justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the 
constitutional authority of Congress.”196 
While the fight over the scope of the Recommendations Clause occurs 
mostly on political landscape outside of the courtroom, the Supreme Court’s 
doctrinal test remains a useful guidepost because it instantiates founding 
principles relevant to interbranch political disputes.197 After invoking 
Montesquieu’s warning that “[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative 
and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates,” 
James Madison famously wrote in Federalist 47 that Montesquieu “did not 
mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control 
over, the acts of each other.”198 Instead, Madison argued that a problem arises 
only “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same 
hands which possess the whole power of another department,” such as if “the 
entire legislative body . . . possessed . . . the supreme executive authority.”199 
Justice Story agreed, contending that the separation of powers was “not meant 
to affirm[] that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, 
and have no common link of connexion or dependence, the one upon the 
other, in the slightest degree.”200 The Supreme Court’s separation-of-powers 
test adopted this “more pragmatic, flexible”201 approach to account for the 
messy reality of governing with three coequal branches that Justice Jackson 
described in his Youngstown concurrence: 
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot 
conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on 
isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the 
Constitution diffuses power to better secure liberty, it also contemplates that 
 
196 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. 
197 In 2015, in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court applied a variation of 
this test that only asked whether a President acting against the expressed will of Congress asserted 
power that was “both exclusive and conclusive on the issue.” 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (internal 
quotations omitted). But, unlike the presidential power in question in that case—the power to 
recognize foreign sovereigns—even the 2016 OLC opinion conceded that the power to 
recommend measures to Congress is inherently not exclusive because anyone can make legislative 
recommendations to Congress. See 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *9 (“[T]he ability to 
make recommendations to Congress—unlike the authority to nominate officers, receive 
ambassadors, or enforce the laws—is widely shared with other persons.”). Thus, the balancing 
framework better applies the separation-of-powers principles represented in the Youngstown 
framework to the situation in question here, where a triggering law may be thought to “have the 
potential for disruption” of the president’s recommending function, even as that function is 
inherently not exclusive. See infra subsection III.E.2 for more on the nonexclusivity of the 
Recommendations Clause. 
198 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 314 (James Madison) (Modern Library ed., 1941). 
199 Id. at 314-15. 
200 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 524, at 8 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
201 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 442. 
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practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It 
enjoins upon its branches separateness, but interdependence; autonomy, but 
reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon 
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.202 
Under my preferred interpretation of “necessary and expedient” as a 
limitation on the scope of the President’s duty to make recommendations, 
triggering laws that do no more than require executive recommendations, 
without dictating their contents, do not impair any executive function. Recall 
the Medicare law that required the President to recommend legislation to 
“respond” to a Medicare funding warning.203 That law intentionally did not 
dictate the content of that recommendation: the next paragraph of the bill 
merely expressed the “sense of Congress” that the recommended legislation 
“should be designed to eliminate excess general revenue Medicare funding.”204 
A triggering law that merely requires the President to “respond” with a 
legislative recommendation, the contents of which remain within his 
discretion, does not impair his ability to make judgements about necessary 
and expedient legislation for recommendation to Congress.205 There is no 
“potential for disruption” of executive functions under the first prong of the 
Supreme Court’s test. 
Even accepting the government’s argument that “necessary and 
expedient” confers discretion over when to make recommendations, the 
objective of triggering laws—to guarantee Congress access to the uniquely 
informed policy recommendations of the executive—should in most cases be 
seen as “overriding,” justifying the intrusion on that discretion. Article I of 
the Constitution vests “All legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress 
and empowers it to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution” the powers it enumerates.206 Meanwhile, the 
Recommendations Clause recognizes the President’s superior access to policy 
information and seeks to ensure that information flows to Congress to aid it 
in exercising the legislative power.207 Continuing the example of the Medicare 
 
202 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
203 31 U.S.C. § 1105(h)(1) (2018) (citing MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 801(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 
2537). 
204 Id. (emphasis added). 
205 Scholars and the courts have applied separation of powers principles to interpret other 
presidential powers and responsibilities, like the President’s foundational duty to “take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed,” to imply limited negative power. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Kendall 
ex rel Stokes v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (“To contend that the obligation imposed 
on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel 
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.”); Kent, Leib & Shugerman, supra note 44, 
at 2182 (“[T]he language of faithful execution is for the most part a language of limitation, 
subordination, and proscription, not a language of empowerment and permission.”). 
206 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8. 
207 See supra Section I.A. 
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law, it would substantially undermine Congress’s ability to make necessary 
and proper health and budget policy if it could not require the input of the 
President, who oversees the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
specifically the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Balanced 
against the relatively minor intrusion on the President’s discretion to decide 
what is “necessary and expedient”—after all, every presidential budget since 
the funding warning law passed has recognized the importance of maintaining 
Medicare solvency208—Congress’s need to inform itself is “overriding.” 
The open-ended type of recommendation required by the Medicare law 
is not unique. Recent administrations have claimed discretion under the 
Recommendations Clause to avoid this type of triggering law in numerous 
legislative contexts. The Trump Administration, for example, has asserted 
discretion over whether to make statutorily required, but open-ended, 
recommendations on patent policy,209 intelligence gathering,210 and many 
other areas.211 It is possible to imagine a triggering law that requires too 
much—say, a presidential recommendation every week—and thus 
impermissibly frustrates the President’s ability to craft recommendations the 
same way muzzling laws do, but I found no examples of such legislation. 
Some of the laws to which the Trump Administration and other 
administrations have objected also at least arguably dictate the position of the 
administration,212 which would impede the President’s discretion to judge 
what is necessary and expedient and would also subvert the purpose of the 
Recommendations Clause to guarantee that Congress receives the benefit of 
the President’s opinions.213 But with respect to triggering laws in which 
 
208 See supra note 123. 
209 Presidential Statement on Signing the Study of Underrepresented Classes Chasing 
Engineering and Science Success Act of 2018, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 748 (Oct. 31, 2018). 
210 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs, Views Letter on S. 3153, the Matthew 
Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019 (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/ola/page/file/1094616/download [https://perma.cc/A7ZZ-8DHQ]. 
211 See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing The First Step Act of 2018, 2018 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 860 (Dec. 21, 2018) (regarding criminal justice policy); Presidential Statement on 
Signing the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 832 (Dec. 4, 2018) (regarding Coast Guard policies); Presidential Statement on Signing the 
Securely Expediting Clearances Through Reporting Transparency Act of 2018, 2018 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 362 (May 22, 2018) (regarding security clearance policies). 
212 See, e.g., Presidential Statement on Signing the John S. McCain National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 533 (Sept. 28, 2018) (“[The 
bill] purport[s] to dictate the position of the United States . . . . My Administration will treat these 
provisions consistent with the President’s exclusive constitutional authorities . . . to determine the 
terms upon which recognition is given to foreign sovereigns, to receive foreign representatives, and 
to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy.”). 
213 It would also potentially hamper the public’s ability to hold the President politically 
accountable. See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2092 (“The President’s constitutional duty to recommend 
measures to Congress imposes a degree of accountability . . . on the President . . . . Foolish laws 
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Congress does no more than require executive input on a specific policy, the 
balance of interests tips in favor of Congress’s ability to inform itself in 
executing its Article I legislative powers—the interest the Framers had in 
mind when they wrote the Recommendations Clause.214 
Muzzling laws provide a useful point of comparison as a type of law that 
does appear to encroach on presidential powers implied by the duty to 
recommend. In his comprehensive exploration of the issue, Sidak argued that 
the Recommendation Clause must be “an authorization by law for the 
President . . . to make such expenditures or incur such obligations as are 
necessary to perform the constitutional duty of providing information and 
recommendations to Congress,” or else “Congress could nullify the 
recommendation clause through an ordinary statute.”215 He concluded that 
“the structure of the Constitution does not allow the appropriations 
power . . . to override the President’s constitutional duty to recommend 
policy measures to Congress. Otherwise, Congress could prevent the 
President from fulfilling any of his duties.”216 By contrast, nothing about 
triggering laws enables Congress to “nullify” the Recommendations Clause 
or “override” the President’s constitutional duty to recommend policy 
measures to Congress. They merely dictate a time and topic on which the 
President must exercise that duty. 
2. Other Exclusive Powers 
The 2016 OLC opinion also argues that, because other presidential 
duties and powers enumerated in Article II have been read as exclusive even 
though the text does not explicitly say as much, the duty to recommend 
should be read the same way.217 The OLC points to the fact that certain 
constitutionally assigned responsibilities have been interpreted as exclusive, 
including that the President “shall nominate . . . Officers of the United 
 
proposed by the President can be identified as such and dragged before the electorate by his 
adversaries.”). Even in this situation, however, the proper administration response would be to 
assert discretion over the content of the recommendation, but still treat the recommendation 
itself as mandatory. 
214 See supra Section I.A; see also Killenbeck, supra note 11, at 286 (“There is little doubt that 
the framers considered it essential for the President to provide a critical mass of information that 
would serve as an important element of the legislative process.”); William P. Marshall, The Limits 
on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 818 (“[T]he 
Recommendations Clause, unlike the text of the Take Care Clause, sets forth a congressional role: 
Congress is designated to receive the President’s recommendations. This would suggest, if anything, 
that Congress has a particularly strong justification for wanting to understand the bases of the 
President’s recommendation to it . . . .”). 
215 Sidak, supra note 11, at 2100-01. 
216 Id. at 2101-02. 
217 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *9. 
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States,”218 that he “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”219 
and that the executive branch holds prosecutorial power through the 
President’s charge to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”220 On 
this basis, the OLC asserts the broad proposition that “where Article II 
assigns a duty to the President, the President alone has discretion to execute 
that duty . . . .”221 
The OLC concedes that “the ability to make recommendations to 
Congress—unlike the authority to nominate officers, receive ambassadors, or 
enforce the laws—is widely shared with other persons,” but dismisses the 
distinction on grounds that the power to recommend is “unique” and 
“consequential.”222 But the distinction carries an important difference. Anyone 
can make recommendations to Congress without having an impact on the 
President’s ability to recommend. By contrast, the discretion to appoint a 
government official must be held by the President alone to avoid overlapping 
appointments and unclear lines of authority. Likewise, diplomacy and law 
enforcement would be frustrated if other branches had discretion to conduct 
international negotiations or to prosecute breaches of the law. The nature of 
these duties demands exclusive authority to carry them out, but, as the OLC 
concedes, the duty to recommend is of a different nature. Nothing about 
Congress requiring the President to provide a recommendation impedes the 
President’s ability to recommend measures to Congress. 
Further, a recommendation’s effect depends wholly on the reaction of the 
listener. When the President appoints someone, she assumes a position 
together with its duties and powers; when the President receives an 
ambassador, a diplomatic interchange occurs; when the Department of Justice 
initiates a prosecution, a particular set of procedures follows. By contrast, 
when the President makes a recommendation to Congress, nothing else 
necessarily happens—triggering laws simply do not implicate the President’s 
ability to carry out his constitutionally assigned functions.223 It is not 
triggering laws that threaten the “equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system,” but rather presidents operating at the “lowest ebb” of 
their power claiming discretion to ignore them.224 
 
218 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
219 U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
220 Id. 
221 2016 OLC Opinion, supra note 55, at *9. 
222 Id. 
223 See Sidak, supra note 11, at 2082 (“Congress has no obligation under the recommendation 
clause to act upon the President’s recommendations.”). 
224 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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F. Implications 
If the expansive view of negative power under the Recommendations 
Clause advanced by recent administrations prevails, presidents may be able to 
bottleneck important policy information and shield their administrations from 
oversight. There is evidence that both of these things are already happening. 
With respect to policy information, for example, the Trump 
Administration sent a DOJ views letter objecting to a legislative provision that 
required the Secretary of State to submit to Congress “[r]ecommendations for 
any legislative authorities required to implement” a government-wide 
reorganization plan.225 It objected on grounds that the provision “amount[ed] 
to [a] requirement[] that the Secretary, an executive branch official under 
plenary presidential supervision, submit recommendations for legislative 
measures to the Congress” in violation of the President’s “exclusive authority” 
under the Recommendations Clause.226 The Administration’s suggested 
remedy was to make the recommendations “precatory” instead of 
mandatory.227 It is not clear that the President has authority to insist that he 
get to pre-approve the statutorily required recommendations of 
subordinates,228 but even accepting that argument, the remedy should not be 
to declare the requirement to recommend precatory, but rather to interpret it 
consistent with the President’s power to clear the recommendation first. That 
is, even if the President can funnel all executive branch recommendations 
through his office, the Recommendations Clause does not permit him to 
refuse to transmit those recommendations to Congress. 
There is also evidence that administrations are willing to use the 
Recommendations Clause to shield themselves from oversight. For example, 
Vice President Dick Cheney, in litigation with the General Accounting 
Office, argued on Recommendations Clause grounds that he should not have 
to produce documents related to an energy task force he led.229 Because 
forming legislative recommendations was among the task force’s duties and 
“[b]ecause Congress lacks any power whatsoever to legislate with respect to 
the exclusive Presidential prerogatives reflected in the Opinions and 
Recommendations Clause,” he claimed that “Congress cannot investigate—
nor can it delegate to the Comptroller General the power to investigate [the 
 
225 See Views Letter on S. 1631, supra note 62 (internal quotation omitted). 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 See Krent, supra note 11, at 544 (arguing that “[t]he unitary executive principle does 
not . . . demand that the power to make legislative proposals be exclusive” and that “[s]cant 
precedent supports President Bush’s stance that Congress cannot require agency heads and others 
to make recommendations for legislation”). 
229 Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d. 51, 59 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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task force].”230 The notion that presidential powers inherently prevent 
congressional oversight is a stretch—as one commentator put it, the argument 
“makes sense only if one discounts the need for congressional investigations 
in the first place.”231 Still, it is important to note that the Vice President saw 
the Recommendations Clause as a potential shield to oversight at the highest 
level. This case was decided on other grounds, so it remains an open question 
whether executive branch officials will seek to revive the argument.232 The 
Trump Administration is the subject of a number of investigations where the 
issue could perhaps arise.233 Indeed, it may already have arisen, to the extent 
that haggling over documents sought in connection with oversight happens 
behind closed doors. 
There are other ways one could imagine an administration stretching the 
Recommendations Clause to prevent the disclosure of information to 
Congress, too. For example, were an administration to interpret information 
gathered by executive agencies in the execution of the law that goes into 
forming legislative recommendations as encompassed by the term “measures” 
in the Recommendations Clause, that would potentially threaten the execution 
of the large number of laws that include agency reporting requirements.234 
IV. REMEDIES 
I have shown that Presidents commonly seek to change pending 
legislation and reinterpret laws based on what I argue is a false reading of the 
Recommendations Clause. If I am right that this exercise of negative 
executive power represents an unconstitutional infringement on the 
legitimate legislative activities of Congress, the natural question remains 
what options exist to cure the problem. This Section identifies three such 
options: executive reinterpretation, judicial review, and congressional action. 
 
230 Id. at 59-60. 
231 See Marshall, supra note 214, at 819 (“The problem with any argument for any categorical 
exclusion of executive action from investigative purview is that it misses this essential point of 
Congress’s having investigative power in the first place.”). 
232 But see Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 445 (1977) (finding in the oversight 
context that “there is abundant statutory precedent for the regulation and mandatory disclosure of 
documents in the possession of the Executive Branch” and that “[s]uch regulation of material 
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233 See Trump Team’s Conflicts and Scandals: An Interactive Guide, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2019) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/trump-administration-conflicts/ [https://perma.cc/E343-
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234 See Jonathan G. Pray, Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of the Oversight 
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of [federal agencies] . . . . Congress has increasingly relied on reporting requirements as its favored 
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812 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 769 
A. Executive Reinterpretation 
The easiest and most obvious option is for a future administration to 
formally supersede the incorrect interpretations of the Recommendations 
Clause advanced by recent administrations with one that recognizes the 
constitutional legitimacy of triggering laws. Precedent exists for the OLC to 
change its position on separation of powers issues to better align itself with 
prevailing legal thought.235 The discrepancy between different 
administrations in the frequency with which they object to triggering laws 
also suggests that a President sensitive to executive overreach could 
successfully influence executive branch policy regarding the exercise of power 
under the Recommendations Clause. For example, President George W. Bush 
issued sixty signing statements objecting to triggering laws on 
Recommendations Clause grounds, while President Obama issued just 
two.236 If a future President looks negatively on the record of the Trump 
Administration and its prolific use of signing statements to object to 
triggering laws, he or she could likely succeed in changing the practice. 
B. Judicial Review 
Another somewhat more complicated, but not infeasible, avenue for relief 
is the courts. While justiciability issues would pose obstacles to challenging a 
President’s refusal to comply with a triggering law in court,237 Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton demonstrates that interbranch political disputes can 
be susceptible to judicial review.238 In that case, the Supreme Court overruled 
the lower court’s determination that it could not review the executive branch’s 
refusal to follow a law passed by Congress, declaring that “[t]he courts are 
fully capable of determining whether this statute may be given effect, or 
instead must be struck down in light of authority conferred on the Executive 
by the Constitution.”239 
Standing requirements also would not pose an insurmountable barrier to 
judicial relief for members of Congress or even private individuals, 
 
235 See, e.g., The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 
Op. O.L.C. 124, 124 (1996) (superseding a previous OLC memo from 1989 written under a different 
president and outlining somewhat different arguments about the separation of powers on grounds 
that “subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court and certain differences in approach to the issues 
make it appropriate to revisit and update the Office’s general advice on separation of powers issues”). 
236 See supra Section II.C.2. 
237 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is 
primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). 
238 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
239 Id. at 191. 
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depending on the wording of the triggering law in question.240 Members of 
Congress have been found to have Article III standing in numerous 
contexts.241 Recently, the D.C. District Court found in Blumenthal v. Trump 
that 201 members of Congress had standing to sue President Trump for 
alleged violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the Constitution.242 
The central question in the standing decision in that case was whether the 
President accepting foreign emoluments without seeking the consent of 
Congress, as required by the Constitution, constituted an “injury in fact” to 
the members of Congress by denying them the opportunity to provide their 
consent.243 The Court found that it did.244 While injury by this type of vote 
nullification is distinct from the type of vote nullification that occurs when a 
President ignores a triggering law, they are analogous in an important way. 
As the Blumenthal court put it, both leave members of Congress unable to 
“obtain their remedy in Congress.”245 
In Kennedy v. Sampson, the D.C. Circuit found that a U.S. Senator had 
standing to sue the executive branch for an allegedly unconstitutional pocket 
veto of legislation passed by both houses of Congress.246 The Blumenthal court 
cited a subsequent case’s support for Kennedy’s finding of standing for the 
proposition that a “single Member of Congress could have standing to sue 
based on a vote nullification claim when it was the President’s action . . . that 
nullified the Member’s vote.”247 To be sure, it is far from clear that a court 
would find that members of Congress have standing to sue a President for 
refusing to follow a triggering law.248 The point is merely that it is equally as 
far from clear that it would not. 
A cleverly drafted triggering law could also create standing for a private 
individual or entity to sue. For example, in Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Secretary 
of State, the D.C. Circuit found that a private individual had standing to sue 
 
240 To establish standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) a sufficient causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, and (3) a likelihood that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157-58 
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doctrine). 
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245 Id. at 61. 
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247 Blumenthal, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 61 (citing Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 117 (D.C. Cir. 
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the State Department for its refusal to follow a law providing that Americans 
born in Jerusalem could elect to have “Israel” listed as their place of birth on 
their passports.249 Just as presidents often do when signing a triggering law, 
President George W. Bush issued a statement on signing the law in question 
explaining that he would construe it as “advisory” because it “impermissibly 
interferes with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the 
Nation’s foreign affairs and to supervise the unitary executive branch.”250 The 
court found that the plaintiff had standing because “he did not get what the 
statute entitled him to receive,” regardless of the fact that his injury was not 
the traditional sort of “economic, physical, or psychological damage . . . .”251 
It is not difficult to imagine a triggering law drafted so as to entitle a private 
individual or entity to share in the benefits of presidential recommendations, 
and thereby provide standing to sue in the event a President refused to 
comply with it. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), for 
example, requires public notice of all advisory committee meetings, provides 
that “[i]nterested persons shall be permitted to attend, appear before, or file 
statements with any advisory committee,” and further provides that 
documents “which were made available to or prepared for or by each advisory 
committee shall be available for public inspection.”252 The Zivotofsky court 
specifically emphasized how statutes that entitle individuals to government 
information like FACA provide standing to those who seek but do not receive 
that information.253 Some version of these requirements could be adapted to 
create standing to sue under a triggering law. 
C. Congressional Action 
Of course, Congress would have to care enough to intentionally draft a 
triggering law with a standing hook, and this suggests a third and final avenue 
for redress of a President’s unconstitutional evasion of triggering laws: 
Congress applying pressure through use of its legislative and oversight tools. 
A Congress serious about changing the way an administration applies the 
Recommendations Clause has a variety of methods at its disposal to achieve 
that end. It could make creative use of the appropriations power or employ 
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softer methods of persuasion like holding hearings to question administration 
officials or strategically using the media to draw attention to the issue.254 
The best outcome is one in which a future President recognizes that the 
interpretation of the Recommendations Clause employed by recent 
administrations to escape triggering laws is incorrect, reinterprets the clause 
in line with its history and purpose, and applies that interpretation consistent 
with separation of powers principles. Until that happens, Congress should 
seek redress in the courts and through use of its own institutional powers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Recommendations Clause plays an active role in modern politics and 
legislation, but that role has outgrown its design. Modern administrations 
commonly assert negative power under the Recommendations Clause that 
goes beyond the scope of authority necessary for the President to carry out 
his positive duty to recommend measures to Congress. In doing so, they 
misconstrue the history and purpose of the Recommendations Clause and 
misapply separation of powers principles. The Framers drafted the 
Recommendations Clause to increase the flow of policy information from an 
information-rich President in charge of executing the laws to an information-
thirsty Congress in charge of making new ones. Triggering laws serve 
Congress’s legitimate interest in informing itself without impeding the 
President from performing the duty to supply that information through 
legislative recommendations. Where administrations claim discretion to 
escape statutory requirements to provide those recommendations, Congress 
should assert this reading of the Recommendations Clause to protect its 
institutional interest in obtaining information necessary to sound lawmaking 
and oversight. Accepting the outsized view of executive discretion advanced 
by recent administrations risks giving presidents too much control over 
executive branch information. 
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